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This dissertation attempts to account for the paraJysis of Adorno and Horkheimer's 
Dialectic of Enlightenment, and thus of radical critique in relation to practice in 
general. It begins by demonstrating that there is a methodological problem in the 
connection ofthe dialectical method to Adorno and Horkheimer's philosophy of 
history, which posits Enlightenment both as break with the history of reason, and as a-
historical concept of that history. The dissertation takes as its point of departure their 
discussion of Kant, as exemplary Enlightenment thinker. I will use Martin Jay's The 
Dialectical Imagination and Axel Honneth's Critique of Power- Reflective Stages in a 
Critical Social Theory here. The strategy of the next section is to rehistoricise Kant's 
thought and thus the Enlightenment within its historical moment. This follows a close 
reading of Kant's political philosophy in his' An Answer to the Question: What is 
Enlightenment?' and 'Contest of the Faculties' to show that Kant poses the problem 
of the morality versus politics in terms inseparable from his historical context: the 
emergence of the Modem state, and the French revolution. Two solutions to this 
problem present themselves within Kant's separation of public and private uses of 
reason. Public and private anticipates the Modem separation of state and civil society: 
'moral-political' problem is thus solved by 'publicity', which plays a mediating role. 
A subtextual reading however, proposes that the public/private split refers to an 
intemalisation of the political principle in what Etienne Balibar calls the 'citizen 
subject'. We will use Balibar's paper, "Citizen Subject", to show that the 'citizen 
subject' of Modernity emerges with the French revolution. Finally, these two possible 
solutions to the Kantian moral-political problem will be mapped to the political 
philosophical models of power of Hannah Arendt and Jilrgen Habermas, and Michel 
Foucault respectively. Foucault's model of 'disciplinary' power will be connected to 
the 'citizen subject' while Habermas and Arendt's normative conceptions of 
publicness in their juridico-political models of power will be mapped to the first 
solution based on the dualism state/civil society. I will make use of Cohen and 
Arato's Civil Society and Political Theory, as well as various other secondary texts on 
political philosophy here. The last section will work out more clearly the relationship 
between Foucault's genealogical critique, the 'citizen subject' and the French 











dialectical method in relation to Kant's historical reflection on his own present. To 
work out the conditions of this mode of what we will call radical critique of the 
present by Kant, and its basis on a Modern philosophy of history we will turn to 
Hannah Arendt's reading of Kant's political philosophy from his Aesthetics. Here 
Reinhart Koselleck' s Futures Past - On the Semantics of Historical Time will prove 
instructive on the link between Kant's philosophy of history, based on the 
metahistorical concept of revolution and Kant's judgement of the French revolution as 
historical event. The main thesis of this dissertation is that the radical critique of the 
present, in this case that of Foucault's genealogy and the dialectical philosophy of 
history of Adorno and Horkheimer are caught up in the same contradictions as Kant's 
radical judgement of the French revolution; and that this problem takes on an 













In the introduction to the Dialectic of Enlightenment (Abbreviated DE), Max 
Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno (abbreviated A-H), discuss how they had 
'underestimated' the task they had set themselves: 'nothing less than the discovery of 
why mankind, instead of entering into a truly human condition, is sinking into a new 
kind of barbarism.' (DE, 1944: xi) 
In their preface to the 1969 edition of the Dialectic of Enlightenment Adorno and 
Horkheimer place their work within its historical context, '[T]he work was written 
when the end of the Nazi terror was within sight; nevertheless, in not a few places the 
reality of our times is formulated in a way no longer appropriate to contemporary 
experience' (DE, 1944: ix). Horkheimer and Adorno also explain that they chose to 
'have restricted our revision to the correction of printer's errors and the like', avoiding 
retouching what had been written, 'even the obviously inadequate places' (DE, 1944: 
x). These historicising disclaimers thus express their commitment to stay true to .'a 
theory which holds that the core of truth is historical' (DE, 1944: ix). In other words 
the DE cannot be read separately from its historical context for which it becomes 
more than a mere 'documentation' (DE, 1944: x). It was written in California, 
completed in May 1944, after over 10 years of exile from Nazi Germany, a few 
months before the end of World War II and as the culmination of many years of work 
on the rise of fascism and on capitalism, based on empirical research done in 
Germany and at the Institute's temporary refuge in New York.l It is part of 'the 
theoretical work of German [mostly non-practising Jewish2] emigrants that continued 
despite Hitler' (DE, 1944: xvii). Unlike Walter Benjamin, these were the Jewish 
intellectuals who had made it out of Germany in time3, Adorno leaving as early as 
1933 and the institute being set up in New York in 1934 (Jay, 1973: 38-9). Against 
the background of American capitalism and the 'culture industry,4, the 'Nazi terror' 
and its intellectual casualties, in exile from both home and language, this is arguably a 
book written in a state of depression; an expression of helplessness in the face of the 











It is the argument of this dissertation that Adorno and Horkheimer, nevertheless, that 
is despite their distance from contemporary experience, set out to solve a problem that 
is still of relevance to our own time, the problem of 'Enlightenment'. This is the 
problem of Modernity where being modem requires being enlightened. Exactly what 
such a statement as 'being enlightened' or even 'modem' means both then and now, 
or why this question formulates itself as a 'problem' is part of the aim of this 
dissertation to discuss. Peter Gay defines the Enlightenment as 'a vastly ambitious 
program, a program of secularisation, humanity, cosmopolitanism, and freedom, 
above all, freedom in its many forms - freedom from arbitrary power, freedom of 
speech, freedom of trade, freedom to realise one's talents, freedom of aesthetic 
response, freedom, in a word, of moral man to make his own way in the world' (Gay, 
1966: 3). This Freedom is based on a belief in the power of one's own 'reason'. The 
DE deals precisely with the consequences of this program of freedom in reason. For 
them the program of enlightenment implies the instrumentalisation of reason as 
domination, the opposite of freedom. Thus enlightenment rationality negates its basis 
in 'freedom' and so negates itself, reverting to myth; this is its dialectic. Adorno and 
Horkheimer find themselves helpless before a problem they can only express in the 
terms of that problem: enlightenment, as the form of Modem knowledge, can only be 
criticised or examined in the terms of that very enlightenment knowledge. The 
paralysis within this theoretical problem, as well as their actual historical situation, 
from which their theory proves to be inseparable, accounts for the devastating tone of 
the book. A-H's method leaves little hope in those things that usually offer a means of 
redemption for Modernity's discontents: literature, art, culture and love are all forms 
of domination. This dissertation expresses my ambivalence: both my respect for the 
negativity of the dialectical method, as well my frustration with its destructiveness. 
The attempts to historcise the production of such a distressing work as the DE in its 
1969 preface are instructive, since it is the main argument of this dissertation is that 
the 'problem' of enlightenment is a problem of history or a philosophy of history that 
bases itself on the historical nature of 'truth'. What we will focus on in Section 1 is to 
show that the paralysis of A-H in a kind of theoretical cul-de-sac is due to a 
problematic relationship between the dialectical method and the philosophy of history 
of DE. Written in an essayist, interpretative style, thus avoiding any systematisation, 











philosophy of history as progress. A-H do this by showing that the history of the 
progress of reason from myth to enlightenment, is in fact its dialectical opposite: the 
progress of domination, and thus the regression of civilisation into barbarism. In order 
to problematise the dialectical method in relation this philosophy of history, which I 
will also show assumes a dialectical form, I will use as my starting point the chapter 
'Juliette, or Enlightenment and Morality'. Here I will make use of Axel Honneth's 
Critique of Power: Reflective Stages in a Critical Social Theory and Martin Jay's The 
Dialectical Imagination. I will argue that this is as the point where the DE runs into a 
kind of knot, or theoretical cul-de-sac. This problematic involves the connection made 
between Kant, Sade and Nietszche, an unlikely constellation of key 
enlightenmentIModern figures. 
This main point of this section is to show that a methodological problem of the 
dialectic surfaces in A-H's dehistoricisation of their own (dialectical) history of 
enlightenment as domination when they posit Enlightenment as a break with all 
previous history of reason. As break with previous forms of reason, 'Enlightenment' 
becomes the particularly Modem form ofreason, that is the instrumental reason of 
domination. However, Adorno and Horkheimer also project it back onto all previous 
history of Western reason, which they have shown takes the form of domination, 
thereby dehistoricising the very Enlightenment that they have historicised by positing 
it as a break with previous history. Thus, employing the dialectical method myself I 
aim to take that very method to the point where it contradicts itself, that is the point 
where it is joined with a particular philosophy of history. The aim of section 2 is to 
take on A-H's dehistoricisation of the Enlightenment by doing the opposite: 
rehistoricising it. 
Section 2 consists of a close reading of Kant, for A-H the exemplary Enlightenment 
thinker, so as to show that the way Kant formulated the problem of 'What is 
Enlightenment?', in his article of the same name, is inextricable from his own 
historical moment, that is from the 'Age of Enlightenment'. I will historicise Kant's 
thought within the Enlightenment as both a philosophical movement and the historical 
era that precedes Modernity and is defined by events like the French revolution, by 
concentrating on the historical conditions of what I call Kant's problem of finding a 











which I will argue is another way of posing the problem of the relationship between 
philosophy and power. My reading will centre on Kant's' An answer to the question: 
"What is Enlightenment?'" and his discussion of that defining event of 
EnIightenmentIModernity, the French revolution, in 'Contest of the Faculties'. I will 
show that two possible resolutions to the Kantian moral-political problem present 
themselves in these papers. Both are premised on Kant's distinction between the 
private and the public uses of reason. The first solution reads this as anticipating the 
Modem separation between state and civil society, and thus sees the solution of the 
moral-political problem in the mediation between state/civil society by 'publicness' or 
a public sphere. This will be shown to be the terms in which Hannah Arendt and 
Jiirgen Habermas articulate their respective political philosophical critiques of 
Modern (civil) society and power. However, the tracing of what seems to be a 
subtextual antinomy within Kant's text on Enlightenment will be argued to reveal 
another reading: the division public/private is internalised within the citizen or subject 
of Modernity, or what I will call the 'citizen subject'. I will borrow this phrase and the 
argument of Etienne Balibar's 'Citizen Subject' to show that the condition of the 
emergence of this double within Kant's political philosophy is the defining historical 
event of Modernity: the French revolution. I will furthermore link its emergence to the 
conception of power within Michel Foucault's genealogical method. This 
rehistoricisation of Kant's political philosophy within the 'Age of Enlightenment' and 
at the moment at which Modernity emerges from it, in the event of the French 
revolution and in the formation of the Modern state separated from civil society (and 
religion), points to two Modern ideas of the nature of (political) power, and its 
relationship to philosophical critique. I aim to show that these are the same terms in 
which the DE articulates its critique of Modernity, and that this is rather closer to the 
Foucauldian genealogical method, than Arendtian or Habermassian normative 
critique. Finally, this leads me to my final section, which intends to demonstrate how 
the critique of Foucault and A-H finds itself caught up in the same theoretical cul-de-
sac, which will be shown to formulate itself in Kantian terms once again, this time 
explicitly in relation to Kant's philosophy of history and the French revolution. 
Section 3 briefly outlines the irreconcilability of Habermas and Arendt's 'juridico-
political model' of power versus Foucault's 'disciplinary' model of power, using 











Power: Recasting the FoucaultlHabermas Debate as my main secondary texts. I then 
tum to Foucault's reading of Kant, to show how both he and A-H inherit a particularly 
Modem problematic of radical critique and the philosophy of history. Foucault will be 
shown to connect Kant's writings on Enlightenment and revolution, as I have done in 
section 2. What Foucault emphasises is Kant's historical understanding of his own 
thought as conditioned by his present, as a mode of historical reflection on the 
present, similar to his own genealogical critique. What I am interested in is in working 
out the conditions of this mode of what I call 'radical' critique of the present. I 
propose to show that its condition is the emergence of the 'citizen subject' with the 
French revolution. However, close examination of Kant's radical approval of that 
historical event reveals a complexity: judgement of this present historical event is 
dependent on being a spectator, removed from the actual revolutionary actors. This is 
Kant's moral-political dilemma in that he at once approves of revolution, and 
condemns revolutionary action as immoral. 
This problem of actor/spectator is what provides for my seemingly remote link 
between radical critique and aesthetics, in which I aim to show that the problematics 
of the respective critiques of A-H and Foucault have take on an aesthetic form, that is 
a particularly Kantian aesthetic form. To work this out I will tum to Hannah Arendt's 
Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy where she makes a link between the political 
and the aesthetic, by reading Kant's political philosophy from his Critique of 
Judgement. She does this by comparing Kant's radical judgement of the French 
revolution to judgements of taste. I will problematise this reading in order to show 
that her own philosophical political critique based on her version of the public/private 
division determines her interpretation of Kant's transcendental deduction of 
judgements of taste as presupposing the existence of society. I will show that in fact 
Kant's deduction contains several unresolved contradictions, which will lead to my 
reformulation of the link between the aesthetic and the political, that is to a different 
aesthetic formulation of the Kantianjudgement of the revolution. Once again this 
more problematic, or problematised conception of political philosophical judgements 
will be mapped to the dialectic of A-H and the genealogical method of Foucault. 
Finally, it will be shown that the unresolved contradictions within Kant's Critique of 
Aesthetic Judgement manifest themselves in his judgement of the French revolution 











This philosophy of history as progress will be shown to be a particularly Modem 
conception of history and time that emerges with the 'revolution', which is also its 
metahistorical concept. This borrows the argument of historian Reinhart Koselleck in 
his book Futures Past-On the Semantics of Historical Time. 
My argument will show that both the Foucault's genealogical method and the 
dialectical philosophy of history of A-H are caught up in this Modem philosophy of 
history based on the metahistorical concept of 'revolution', that emerges with the 
French revolution. As such they are caught up the same aesthetic form of radical 
critique of the present as Kant's radical judgement of the French revolution. 
I Martin Jay follows the creation of the institute in the 20's and its move to New York in 1933, 
following the Nazi assumption of power. (Jay, 1973: chapter 1) 
2 Jay notes that their Jewish background is 'a common thread' in institute members, most of whom 
were non-practising, and often anxious to deny the significance of their ethnic roots. (Jay, 1973: 31-2) 
3 On September 26, 1940,Walter Benjamin 'took his life at the Franco-Spanish border' where he and a 
party of refugees seeking exit from France had been detained and now faced the possibility of 'being 
shipped back to Germany' ifnot allowed to leave. (Arendt, I: 23) 
4 A-H's critique of the mass culture oflate capitalism in The Culture Industry: Enlightenment As Mass 
Deception is an unforgiving account of almost total commodification of culture, as wel1 as a document 











Section 1: Dial M for (E)nlightenment - The Horror of the Dialectic 
My critique of the dialectical method will use as its background Martin Jay's 
discussion of Marxism and the dialectical method in The Dialectical Imagination, and 
Axel Honneth's criticism of A-H's philosophy of history in his book, The Critique of 
Power - Reflective Stages in a Critical Social Theory .. 
Martin Jay's The Dialectical Imagination covers the period from the formation of the 
Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt in the 1920's and its move to America after 
the Nazi assumption of power in 1933, until its return to Germany in 1949, tracing the 
origins of Critical Theory back to the Hegelianised Marxism of Lukacs, the 
integration of psychoanalysis with Marxist materialism, its early studies of fascism, 
and later empirical research on the authoritarian personality and anti-Semitism, until it 
took the (negative) form of the dialectic encountered in DE. 
Martin Jay begins his discussion of ' The Genesis of Critical Theory', '[a]t the very 
heart of Critical Theory was an aversion to closed philosophical systems' (Jay, 1973: 
41). This meant that Critical Theory was 'expressed through a series of critiques of 
other thinkers and philosophical traditions' (Jay, 1973: 41), it is an immanent 
criticism based on close reading and interpretation that leads the object of analysis to 
its point of self-contradictlon in its own terms, without reference to some external 
vantage point against which the 'truth' of a text can be measured. I Critical Theory 
could likewise be applied to social phenomena and cultural forms as well as texts, 
using its dialectical method, which we will discuss in more detail below. 
Critical Theory as a Marxism 
'Critical Theory' can be defined as the particular 'brand' of Marxism of the Institute 
for Social Research, or the Frankfurt School as they have become known. However, it 
is not easy to pin the label of a dogmatic 'dialectical materialism' onto their work, 
which was characterised by 'a refusal to consider Marxism a closed body of received 
truths' (Jay, 1973: 254), as such it was no 'brand' of Marxism at all. While influenced 











critical of the Lukacs's positing of the proletariat as 'the subject and object of history' 
(Jay, 1973: 46-7), saying that this was merely are-appearance of the transcendental 
subject, in other words a 'metaphysical core at the center of his argument'2 (Jay, 
1973: 47). Thus, while the dialectic uses MarxistlMaterialist terms of analysis, 
especially alienation, reification, and ideology, it anticipates late Marxism's 
complication of a simple deterministic relationship of economic base to 
(cultural/philosophical) superstructure}, instead seeing the h\lo as inextricably 
intertwined. It was also critical of a 'fetishization' of labour in the left's 'belief in the 
revolutionary subjectivity-objectivity of the proletariat; instead of a utopian idea of 
'socialist man'; they tended to reserve a place for a fully formed subject, not the 
ideological Bourgeois individual. In fact, Horkheimer expressed his disillusion with 
the proletariat because of its 'conformist tendencies (Jay, 1973: 84). 
'Critical Theory did not see itself simply as the expression of the consciousness of one class 
... it focussed its energies on what traditional Marxists had relegated to a secondary position, 
the cultural superstructure of modem society ... concentrating ... on two problems: the 
structure and development of authority and the emergence and proliferation of mass culture.' 
(Jay, 1973: 84). 
Jay mostly focuses on the far from smooth experience of critical theory in America4, 
and his carefully objective intellectual history often follows a single theme, outlined 
in his introduction: the dilemma of the 'radical intellectual' between choosing 
'political involvement' or 'critical distance' (Jay, 1973: xiv). This is expressed in the 
institute's lack of early political alignment with the communist party in Germany, and 
its strong critique of Stalinist Russia, as well as its later isolation and disillusion with 
radical politics within America. Jay sums this up: 'Disillusioned with the Soviet 
Union, no longer even marginally sanguine about the working classes of the West, 
appalled by the integrative power of mass culture, the Frankfurt School travelled the 
last leg of its long march away from orthodox Marxism' (Jay, 1973: 256). Martin Jay 
explains that DE was part of a 'critical shift' in the Frankfurt School's perspective, 
itself a response to the 'new social reality', both that following 'the end of the war and 
the defeat of fascism', and the one they had already experienced in their last decade in 
the United States (Jay, 1973: 254). This 'theoretical shift' is best expressed in the 











production with 'class conflict' as its motor. For Martin Jay, this is the philosophy of 
history as domination of nature, this reduces all thought to the instrumental reason of 
the knowing subject over its object(s): both external as well as man's internal nature. 
A New Philosophy of History 
The principle of A-H's philosophy of history is no longer production, but reason as a 
mode of domination, of which capital is one moment. What this meant is that 
capitalism was now seen as the 'specific, historical form of domination characteristic 
of the bourgeois era of Western history' (Jay, 1973 :256). Both man and nature were 
the objects of domination, for which Adorno and Horkheimer no longer implicate the 
ideology of the capitalist class of the Bourgeoisie but the whole of Western reason, 
and in particular the reduction of all reason to 'instrumental reason' by the 
Enlightenment. The origin of domination in enlightened reason is in the Cartesian 
separation of subject and object, so that all knowledge consists of the sUbsumption of 
particulars under the general: the external application of (subjective) knowledge as 
method to a separate reality that must conform to its theory. 
'The concordance of the mind of man and the nature of things that he had in mind is 
Patriarchal .. [K]nowledge, which is power, knows no obstacles ... Technology is the 
essence of this knowledge. It does not \vork by concepts and images, by the fortunate insight, 
but refers to method. the exploitation of work, and capital ... [W]hat men learn from nature is 
how to use it in order to wholly dominate it and other men.' (DE, 1944: 4) 
Axel Honneth shows that the result of this one-way relationship between subject and 
object is the failure of traditional theory 'to recogniseits own constitutive context', 
that is as the 'co-operative achievement of all labouring subjects' (HOImeth, 1991: 7). 
It is the task of critical theory then to restore self-reflexivity to knowledge, that is to 
historicize it at its particular moment within the process of its productive/dominative 
relation to nature. 
This was a move away from classical Marxism5, which sees in the productive process 
of the domination of nature the potential for the social/labouring subject to recognise 
itself as the agent of history and thus to undo the ideology of its own domination. 











'implicitly put ... in the Enlightenment tradition'. Marx is accused of a 'fetishization' 
of labour in his' overemphasis on the centrality of labor as man's mode of self-
realisation', yet another form of the 'reification of nature' and of man; and in fact 
Horkheimer accused Marx of aiming to tum the entire world into a "giant 
workhouse". (Jay, 1973: 259). Most importantly within the DE, this reflects a 
methodological shift so that the dialectic (of what becomes increasingly difficult to 
cal1 'dialectical materialism') was now turned away from the material substructure of 
society to analyse the history of reason as domination within what Honneth calls its 
'indirect witnesses from intel1ectual history' (Honneth, 1991: 37). We wil1 examine 
the implications of this shift in the philosophy of history according to Honneth below. 
It is now to the dialectical method of the philosophy of history as domination to which 
we must tum, to show how it is negatively applied to this intellectual history. 
The Dialectical Method: Myth/EDlighteDmeDt/~DlighteDmeDt 
In their own words, 'the critical section [of DE] ... concentrates on two theses: myth 
is already enlightenment; and enlightenment reverts to mythology' (A-H, 1944: xvi). 
This critical section is concerned with those 'indirect witnesses of intellectual 
history': firstly, the Odyssey 'as one of the earliest representative testimonies of 
Western Bourgeois civilisation' and then 'Kant, Sade, and Nietzsche, who mercilessly 
elicited the implications oithe Enlightenment' (DE, 1944: xvi). In each case the 
interpretation traces this 'dialectic of myth and enlightenment', that is 'the self-
destruction of enlightenment' (DE, 1944: xiii-xiv). 
In the 'Concept of Enlightenment' A-H define enlightenment as 'progressive thought' 
in general, as 'having always aimed at liberating men from fear and establishing their 
sovereignty ... The program of Enlightenment was the disenchantment of the world; 
the dissolution of myths and the substitution of knowledge for fancy.' (DE, 1944: 3) 
Thus, enlightenment can be traced back to all forms of 'demythologisation', where 
myth is replaced by the 'calculability of the world' via laws, equations and scientific 
principles. However, this process of 'demythologisation' is itself subject to the same 
processes of 'disenchantment' or 'dissolution' as myth. Adorno and Horkheimer trace 











the Greek Gods to metaphysics and magic, and finally to the dissolution of all myths: 
Modem science. They explain: 
The national religion or patriarchal solar myth is itself an Enlightenment with which the 
philosophic form can compare itself on the same level. And now it has its requital. Mythology 
itself set off the unending process of enlightenment in which over and again, '.\lith the 
inevitability of necessity, every specific theoretic view succumbs to the destructive criticism 
that it is only a belief ~ until even the very notions of spirit, of truth and indeed, enlightenment 
itself, have become animistic magic .... [J]ust as the myths already realise the enlightenment, 
so enlightenment with every step becomes more deeply engulfed in mythology. It receives all 
Its matter from the myths; in order to destroy them. (DE, 1944: 11-12) 
This quote expresses the dialectical tension between myth and Enlightenment by 
setting them up first as in binary opposition: myth/Enlightenment, where 
Enlightenment both originates in myth and so to speak supercedes it by replacing its 
'superstitions' based on illusions, other-worldly powers or 'hidden qualities' with 
rational explanations based on numerical rules and 'utilility' for the domination of 
nature. Thus, enlightenment is both myth and in the hierarchy of the binary, the 
progress from myth to more enlightened myth. However, its origin in myth implies 
that the latest stage in enlightenment (or enlightened myth) could also be subject to 
the same demythologisation or Enlightenment. Thus myth/enlightenment is shown to 
be a binary that fails to hold. easily becoming enlightenment/myth. Now a further 
tension exists within this passage, between 'enlightenment' as an 'unending process' 
from myth to 'Enlightenment', itself merely another 'philosophical form' of 
knowledge expressing domination, and that particular period of philosophy preceding, 
and often seen as the condition for Modernity, 'the Enlightenment'. 
A dialectical 'knot' 
To demonstrate and to problematise the dialectical method, it is necessary to quote 
Adorno and Horkheimer at length: 
The enlightenment of Modem times advanced from the very beginning under the banner of 
mdicalism: this distinguishes it from any of the earlier stages of demythologisation. When a 
new mode of social life allowed room for a new religion and a new way of thinking, the 











gods ... [T]his is the line both of destruction and of civilisation. Each step forward on it 
represents some progress, a stage of enlightenment. But whereas all earlier changes, from pre-
animism to magic, from the matriarchal to a patriarchal culture, from the polytheism of the 
slave owners to the Catholic hierarchy, replaced older mythologies with new - though 
enlightened- ones, and substituted the head of legions for the Great Mother, the adoration of 
the Lamb for that of the totem, the brilliance of enlightened reason banished as mythological 
any fonn of devotion which claimed to be objective, and grounded in actuality. All previous 
obligations therefore succumbed to the verdict which pronounced them taboo- not excluding 
those which were necessary for the existence of the bourgeois order itself. The instrument by 
means of which the bourgeoisie came to power, the liberation of forces, universal freedom, 
self-determination in short, the Enlightenment, itself turned against the bourgeoisie once, as 
a system of domination, it had recourse to suppression ... [I]t's antiauthoritarian tendency ... 
ultimately makes it as inimical to the bourgeoisie as it was to the aristocracy ... [FJinally, the 
antiauthoritarian principle has to change into its very antithesis into opposition to reason ... 
[A]fter civil virtue and love ofhurnanity ... philosophy proceeded to proclaim authority and 
hierarchy as virtues ... [B]ut the Enlightenment possesses no argument against even such a 
perversion ... for the plain truth had no advantage over distortion, and rationalisation none 
over the ratio, if they could have no practicai benefit themselves. With the fonnalisation of 
reason, to the extent that its preferred function is that of a symbol for neutral procedures, 
theory itself becomes an incomprehensible concept .. , [O}nce it is harnessed to the dominant 
mode a/production, the Enlightenment- which strives to undermine any order which has 
become repressive -abrogates itself.' (DE, 1944: 93) 
The method of the dialectic sets up certain sets of binary oppositions, tenns which 
appear at first to have a hierarchical relationship, the fonner being the origin of the 
latter (myth/enlightenment); or a reciprocal relationship, the one detennining the 
other, (enlightenment/Enlightenment). However, the dialectic exposes the 
interchangeability of these tenns, which no longer detennine one-another in any 
stable hierarchical or reciprocal relationship, but whose relationship is 'dialectical'. 
The sense of dialectic here is partly Hegelian, since it implies a supersession of one 
tenn by the other, a negation which preserves what is superceded. However, it is also 
dialectical materialist in that it incorporates Marx's critique of the one-way direction 
of the Hegelian dialectic, that is from ideas/spirit/consciousness to material life, and 
so also negates the tenn on the other side. To demonstrate this double negation of the 
dialectic, let us take the binary: bourgeois capitalism/Enlightenment. 
A dialectical materialism would read Enlightenment as the fonn of enlightenment of 











Bourgeois Capitalist class, 'the instrument by means of which the bourgeoisie came to 
power, the liberation of forces, universal freedom, self-determination' (above quote). 
But, this is a two-way dialectic, and while the economic base may have determined 
this bourgeois ideology, this 'instrument' also takes on a life of its own and in fact the 
ratio 'itself turned against the bourgeoisie', that is against the bourgeois capitalist base 
of the liberal market economy, which it supposedly negates by replacing this with 
another 'enlightenment': instrumental reason or the ratio.6 Not only does the dialectic 
undermine the stable binary opposition of either the Hegelian dialectic or dialectical 
materialism, such as that between a realm of consciousness and the material, but it 
negates both sides of any opposition or takes any two mutually defining terms to the 
point where their relationship can no longer hold: the ratio negates its origin in 
bourgeois ideology, which itself has bourgeois capitalism as its origin, capitalism 
itself being the historical form of domination, i.e. of the ratio extending from Decartes 
to Kant. Thus, capitalism originates in the 'instrumental reason' that liquidates it. In 
the same way myth is replaced by magic, which in tum is replaced by religion, itself 
effaced finally by science, which reverts to myth in the form of numbers. All binaries 
suffer the same 'fate' of mutual negation at the hands of the dialectical method of A-
H. Reason becomes the ratio, the general becomes the particular, subject reverts to 
object, thought reverts to practice, culture becomes nature and civilisation turns to 
barbarism. 
I will use this lengthy quote to demonstrate and problematise the dialectical method. 
The Enlightenment can be defined as that period of philosophy following the 
Renaissance, of which Rousseau and Kant are representative, and which is usually 
treated as the intellectual pre-history of the French Revolution, which in many ways 
can be thought of as the definitive break between the classical age and Modernity. 
What differentiates it from previous forms of enlightenment as 'demythologisation' is 
its 'antiauthoritarianism'. It banishes any form of knowledge based on some authority 
outside of 'instrumental reason' or the ratio. There is no outside or objective position, 
such as a transcendental subjectivity, morality or metaphysics, its logic is 'immanent'. 
Its only authority is the totalising objectivity of instrumental reason, or what A-H 
refer to as ratio as that formula for survival based on the 'principles of self-
preservation' and the 'mastery of nature'. 'Instrumental Reason' is that phase of 











demythologisation, by making its own internal logic, the principle of Modern science, 
the only authority. Another binary enlightenment/Enlightenment fails to hold since 
the Enlightenment devours its reciprocal term, its origin, and in doing so reverts to 
'myth'. However, there is a methodological problem with this idea of a break. 
This lengthy choice of quote is instructive on a particular problem of historicisation 
inherent in this dialectical negation. Let us take up from the example of the dialectic 
of Bourgeois capitalism/Enlightenment, where by ratio we mean the reduction of all 
of Western thought to 'instrumental reason'. What I mean here by Bourgeois 
Capitalism is that stage of early Capitalism which is determined by the ideologies of 
Bourgeois liberalism, or market capitalism based on the emergence of the private 
sphere of traders, merchants and later factory owners, who make up the Bourgeois 
class to which Marx's ideology critique is directed. In A-H's framework the 
Enlightenment, as philosophical era, is that phase of philosophical thought that is 
'dialectically' attached to this phase of 'domination', it includes the radical thought of 
the French revolutionaries, their ideas of human rights, the general will, the 
sovereignty of the people and the 'freedom' of the individuaL However, as 
demonstrated in the double negative nature of A-H's dialectic, if this Enlightenment 
originates in the 'era of Bourgeois capitalism', while as Adorno and Horkheimer 
insist on its being the definitive form of demythologisation that manifests itself in the 
form domination that is Bourgeois capitalism, then how can this demythologisation 
\vhich has already consumed its own origin by becoming domination, be re-negated? 
In other words by making the Enlightenment a break with the process of 
enlightenment A-H negate the dialectic enlightenment/Enlightenment itself. 
'Once it is harnessed to the dominant mode of production, the Enlightenment ... 
abrogates C] itself.' This is the formulation of the problematic, the Enlightenment, is 
intimately tied to the emergence of the modern Bourgeois, or the modern state or 
market capitalism. It will be our argument that its inseparability from this 'dominant 
mode of production', that of the era of capitalism, is what constitutes it is a break with 
all previous forms of enlightenment, or demythologisation. However, we will not 
reduce this to modern capitalism as a simply material, economic base, but rather talk 
about it as part of a particular historical moment, Modernity. In that moment the 











the myth/enlightenment process is lost. Once the dialectical tension of 
myth/enlightenmentiEnlightenment is lost, so is the tension in all the dialectics: 
between materialiconsciousness, Bourgeois capitalism/Enlightenment, material 
domination/ratio, dominant mode of production/enlightenment, and theory/practice. 
The epoch of Enlightenment is tied to the dominant mode of production and so 
becomes historical, an actual break with all previous forms of the history of 
enlightenment, a demythologisation of all myths, including its own. It can have no 
ideology separable from its economic or historical-material basis, since it has itself 
become that basis: 'harnessed to the dominant mode of production', as was no 
previous form of enlightenment to its historical present. 
I will demonstrate the inextricability or dialectical relationship of Enlightenment 
political and philosophical thought from the moment of the emergence of Modern 
capitalism and the democratic state. This relationship to 'Modernity' as such is 
symbolised in the relationship of philosophical thought to the French Revolution. My 
argument hinges on this tension between the notion of enlightenment as an 
'ahistorical' category, referring to the whole of Western reason, and Enlightenment as 
the actual era of Western Philosophy, of the 18th and 19th centuries that is both 
determining of and determined by the historical moment of Modernity, attached as it 
is to the Modern democratic, capitalist state and the idea of revolution. 
The starting point of this argument is the chapter of DE, 'Juliette or Enlightenment 
and morality'. We will explore the problematics of the connection that A-H make 
between such irreconcilable thinkers as KantiSadelNietzsche. This strange 
constellation will be shown to reflect the problem of the dialectical method, as 
discussed, and what we will characterise as A-H's dialectical philosophy of history. 
This is the point where A-H find themselves in a theoretical and historical cul-de-sac. 
The way out of this cul-de-sac will also be via history, that is the historicisation of a 
similar moral-political problem in Kant's philosophy. 
'''hat is 'Enlightenment And/Or Juliette's '~Iorality'? 











The combination of two such irreconcilable figures as Kant, Sade and Nietzsche is 
what initially drew me to this chapter of DE. Limited space has only allowed for me 
to concentrate on Kant, and indirectly Nietzsche, via his influence on Foucault's 
genealogical method. Elements of my argument amount to a defence of Kant from A-
H, but what I am really interested in is how the problems with A-H's dialectical 
method and their philosophy of history take the same form as the political-moral 
problem that Kant tries to resolve via his philosophy of history. This also turns out to 
be the case with Foucault's genealogical method. Let us examine the case A-H make 
against Kant. 
'Juliette or Enlightenment and Morality' begins by showing how Kant's thought is 
exemplary of enlightenment rationality. As such Kant, 'the universal reducer' is 
implicated in reducing 'reason' to the 'instrumental reason' of the Enlightenment, i.e. 
to a form of domination. In his published response to the question, 'What is 
Enlightenment?' Kant replies that it is ' ... man's emergence from his self-incurred 
immaturity (selbstverschuldeten Unmiindigkeit) 8, (DE, 1944: 81) Kant defines 
immaturity as 'the inability to use one's understanding without the guidance of 
another person' (DE, 1944: 81). A-H's reply to the same question employs another 
Kantian text, the Critique of Pure Reason, 'reason has ... for its object only the 
understanding and its purposive employment ... [as the] ... faculty ... of deducing the 
particular from the general' (DE, 1944: 81-2). Thus, Kant is implicated in enforcing 
the 'homogeneity of the universal and the particular guaranteed by ... the unconscious 
operation of the intellectual mechanism which structures perception in accordance 
with the understanding.' (DE, 1944: 82) In other words the subject of knowledge 
determines the object because the 'schematism of the understanding' prepares the 
object for cognition, and not vice-versa. Finally, they close their case against Kantian 
'reason' with a quote from his 'Critique of[Aesthetic] Judgement': 'This concurrence 
of nature with our cognitive faculty is an a priori assumption ... of judgement .... the 
guideline for organised experience' (DE, 1944: 82). 
This imbrication of quotes, the one from Kant's political \""ritings, the others from his 
Critiques of Pure Reason and of Aesthetic judgment, build a somewhat shaky case by 
conflating Kant's notion of public and private reason used in the article 'What is 











judgement, both with 'pure reason'. A close reading of Kant's 'What is 
Enlightenment?' in section 2 will show that there are some points to make in his 
defence for a separation of reason into its public and private uses, so as to resolve 
what I call his moral-political problem. Section 3 will deal with the connection of this 
resolution to 'aesthetic judgement', which is not at all the same as the determinate 
judgement that occurs in the subsumption of a particular under a general concept by 
the understanding, but is an act involving both the imagination and the understanding 
in what Kant calls 'free play'. However, A-H reduce all of Kantian reason to 
'instrumental reason', which is closest to the scientificity of pure reason, based on an 
operation of the 'pure understanding' subsuming the particular under the general. As 
such it is a type of mastery of the 'transcendental subject' of knowledge over the 
object, whether it be nature or man; it is a system serving 'the principles of self-
preservation' and it enables A-H to correct Kant's answer to the question 'What is 
Enlightenment?'. For A-H, '[i]mmaturity is then the inability to survive' (DE, 1944: 
83), thus Enlightenment reason has only one function: survival, as such it is 
'purposeless purposiveness' (DE, 1944: 88). 
A-H take up the moral implications of 'instrumental reason' by using the dialectic to 
connect Kant's 'Categorical Imperative' to those 'black writers of the bourgeoisie' 
(DE, 1944: 118), Nietzsche and Sade. 
It was the hand of philosophy that \\Tote it on the wall-from Kanfs Critique to 0iietzsche's 
Genealogy o/Morals; but one man made out the detailed account. The work of the Marquis de 
Sa de pOltrays "understanding without the guidance of another person": that is, the bourgeois 
individual freed from tutelage. 9 (DE, 1944: 86) 
Thus, it is the principle of the self-legislation of 'enlightened reason', which need 
appeal to no grounds except its own immanent agreement of general principle with 
the particular object that is fitted to it, and not vice-versa, that connects such 
ostensibly irreconcilable thinkers as Kant/SadelNietzsche, if only dialectically. Kant's 
categorical imperative is found to have a dialectical relationship to Juliette, the 'good 
philosopher' who systematically breaks every moral rule of society and religion just 
because she can. Nietzsche's Superman also bases his actions on the 'categorical 











'transvalues' the Christian moral principles based on compassion and 'pity'. The 
dialectic has erased stable oppositions once again. However, asides from this common 
moral lack what unites these 'dark chroniclers' of the bourgeoisie (DE, 1944: 118) to 
Kant, the 'universal reducer.'? 
Julietle or Enlightenment 
While A-H rather unconvincingly reduce all Kantian reason to instrumental reason, 
they do, however, acknowledge 'the unclear relation of the transcendental to the 
empirical ego, and the other unresolved contradictions. Kant's concepts are 
ambiguous.'(DE, 1944: 83) Instead of taking up these contradictions within Kant's 
thought, which is what we plan to do by historicising them, A-H conclude: 
'Conflict between administrative, reifying science, between the public mind and the 
experience of the individual, is precluded by circumstances. The conceptual apparatus 
determines the senses, even before perception occurs; a priori, the citizen sees the 
world as the matter from which he himself manufactures it ... [e]ven before its 
occurrence, the perception which serves to confirm the public judgement is adjusted 
by that judgement.' (DE, 1944: 84) 
This reference to 'public judgement' and 'public mind' in opposition to 'individual' 
experience and 'the citizen', alongside their discussion of ambiguities in Kant's 
thought between a 'transcendental, supraindividual ... reason' and the 'empirical 
ego', point to the very same reduction of which A-H accuse Kant: 'public reason' (as 
that outlined in 'What is Enlightenment?' (and thus public mind and transcendental, 
universal SUbject) is reduced to the individual, empirical (private) experience of the 
citizen, who is only able to 'manufacture' reality according to the concepts of pure 
reason, without reflecting on this process. A-H do not really take up this implicit 
contradiction between the use of public and private reason, or its connection to the 
'citizen' as empirical versus transcendental subject which for our reading of Kant 
will prove productive. Nonetheless, our reading of DE points to an implicit tension 
within their own critique, between morality and reason in its public and private fom1s, 
which we will argue becomes a political and historical problem for Kant. It is to the 










now we will resume our discussion of the methodological problem of the dialectic, 
but this time specifically in relation to A-H's philosophy of history. Axel Honneth's 
discussion of the latter will prove useful on this point. 
A Dialectical Philosophy of History 
Asides from the moral implications of their thought, the link of KantiSadelNietzsche 
is their common historical moment, that is the era of Bourgeois capitalism or the 
liberal market and the beginnings of the Modem, democratic state. We can bring all of 
this under the general title of Modernity, as our own epoch, that which follows the 
reformation and the Renaissance and is most often associated with the French 
Revolution. It is only then that enlightenment thinkers would begin to talk about the 
'citizen', the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, general will and liberalism and the 
market, and civil society as we understand them today. 
Axel Honneth asks useful questions about methodological problems within Adorno's 
philosophy of history as what he calls 'retrogression': 'do the administrative means of 
domination represent the present embodiment of a rationality of control formed at the 
beginning of the civilising process or did the subsequent development of a purposive 
rationality first form with capitalist industrialisation?' (Honneth, 1991: 74). Honneth 
reduces the problematic of the dialectic, which for him is really the problem of 
Adorno's philosophy of history as domination, to the dialectical relationship between 
economic base (capitalist industrialisation)/ideological superstructure (purposive 
rationality). It is tempting for us to do the same, however, what if we were to take 
Honneth's critique of A-H's dialectical philosophy of history as domination-
retrogression and map it to the dialectical method itself, as inseparable from this 
philosophy of history? This would build on a point made by Honneth who sums up 
Adorno's philosophy of history as 'retrogressive anthropogenesis', that is that 'the 
progress of civilisation is exposed as the concealed process of human regression' 
(Honneth, 1991: 37). Honneth demonstrates the sociological deficit in a critical theory 
based on a philosophy of history as the domination of nature, due to critical theory's 
abandonment of the social subject and of 'the existence of an intermediary sphere of 
social action' (Honneth, 1991: 55). However, he sets up tension between 











notion of the progress of production and which thus allows for the possibility of social 
action- since it is still socially produced, versus Adorno's history as 'retrogression'. 
Adorno's focus on all knowledge as domination leads Honneth to conclude that '[t]he 
result is the definitive repression of the social from the social analysis of critical 
theory' (Honneth, 1991: 72). Yet, this tension is itself acknowledged by A-H: 'the 
vital principle of the Dialectic is the tension between the two intellectual 
temperaments conjoined in it.' (DE, 1944: ix) 
I would argue that this internal tension within the dialectic and within the philosophy 
of history, as Honneth describes it, implies that A-H's philosophy of history can also 
be described as dialectical. Stated differently, the dialectical method is partly based on 
a dialectical tension within the philosophy of history: progress of domination! 
retrogression. In other words we have introduced an element of time or process on 
either side of the dialectic: history goes a little bit in one directionlhistory goes 
back\vards in the same direction, a push and pull, a cycle. The philosophy of history is 
also dialectical: history as progressive domination of naturelhistory as retrogression of 
civilisation back to nature. Thus, myth becomes enlightenment/enlightenment reverts 
to myth. 
This puts the problem of the dialectical method, that is its self-negation by positing 
Enlightenment as break, within historical perspective. 
It is my argument that when A-H propose that Enlightenment ends the history of 
enlightenment, they erase the distinction enlightenment/Enlightenment. History as 
retrogression goes a bit too far in the opposite direction so that only one side of the 
historical dialectic remains. What happens is that A-H de-historicise the actual 
historical nature of Enlightenment as the particular form of knowledge peculiar to 
:'10dernity. Modernity here is the historical moment of the Enlightenment, instead of 
reducing it to 'capitalist industrialisation' or the bourgeoisie and the liberal market as 
its economic base, it is constituted as a material historical moment by all those things 
associated with it. including also the modem democratic state, actual historical events 
like the French Revolution or Kant's philosophy and Sade's Juliette. This 
dehistoricisation of Enlightenment as 'instrumental reason' detaches it from 
.. 











'demythologisation' so that it becomes the fonn of all knowledge, instead of the 
Modern fonn of knowledge. While they accuse 'instrumental reason' of failing to 
historicise itself their attempts to attach it to 'the dominant means ofproduction' 
alone are equally fascist, trapping us in a method that pretends to be historical, but 
takes every moment of knowledge and detaches it from its historical origin or location 
to make it the same: the material manifestation of knowledge as domination. 
While it exposes the intimate relation of power as domination to knowledge as a fonn 
of power, which considering the historical context of DE is extremely important, the 
relation of knowledge and power to history merely reduces every historical moment to 
the same tenns of domination, seeing no space for social resistance or praxis. Their 
own failure to recognise the historical origin of this particular Enlighterunent within 
Modernity, seeing Modernity rather as another moment of the enlighterunent that they 
have already subsumed as Enlightenment, means that they are caught up in the very 
same problems of history-thought-power that they want to untangle. It is this 
historical fonn of the dialectic Modernity/Enlightenment, or history/philosophy that 
this first section has aimed to show. 
This will take us into the main part of the argument of this dissertation, which aims to 
show via a close reading of Kant's political writings how he attempts to solve the 
problem of politics and morality: how is a political practice possible within the 
confines of reason and morality. A-H's reductive case against Kant has already given 
us a clue in the contradictions it picks up between 'public reason' and the private 
individual, which is implicitly mapped to the contradiction between empirical ego and 
transcendental reason. Their reduction of Kant's moral philosophy, in the fonn of the 
categorical imperative to 'judgement', itself reduced to the detenninistic act of 'pure 
reason', thus collapsing the moral into another aspect of mechanistic instrumental 
reason, is convincing. However, it neglects a possibility for 'reflective reason' within 
Kant's philosophy. Kant's resolution to the moral-political problem, its connection to 
the Enlightenment and to his own position as enlightenment philosopher will be 
shown to be immanently connected to the historical emergence of the Modem state 
and although less directly the 'public sphere', whose mediatory role is neglected by 
Adorno 10. This strategy, in section 2, of historicising Kant, has as its aim the 











enlightenment to Enlightenment. As such it puts their methodological symptom, the 
dialectic of Modern ityl Enlightenment, in historical perspective. In fact it will be 
argued that they face the same dilemma as Kant, and as all radical critique in 
Modernity: what is the place for (political) action within radical thought? How does 
the philosopher relate himself to his own present, and thus to history? 
As we begin our diagnosis, let us remember that symptoms have a way of structuring 
the existence of the patient, whether their origin is physical or psychological. 
J Susan Buck-Morss calls this Adorno's' logic of disintegration', where especially in his attack on 
Idealist philosophy whereby he shows the impossibility of the 'thing-in-itself since 'objective reality 
'" was present within subjective consciousness' in the forn1 of the 'commodity structure' on which 
consciousness is already modeled (Buck-Morss, 1977: 67; 26-28), 
2 This was a criticism Lukacs would later level at himself, rejecting the book not only from a 
theoretical perspective but because it did not fall in line with the 'dialectical materialism' he was 
required to practise after he went to the soviet union, 
3 For Williams this is the 'alternative Marxist tradition', where 'Consciousness is restored as a primary 
activity' (Williams, 200 I: 160). that of the early Lukacs, Gramsci, and later Althusser. 
4 Asides from the obvious clash of their Marxist position with bemg at the centre of the capitalist 
world, the most difficult intellectual adjustment, as we shall see later, involved coordinating the 
philosophically grounded research practiced by the institute with the rigorous anti-speculative bias of 
American social science, (Jay, 1973: 39) They also made the decision to continue to write in German, 











everything German' (Jay, 1973: 40), which while ensuring a future post-war audience resulted in their 
isolation from the American academic community. 
5 This is the Marxism most closely associated with the 2nd International, based on a detenninistic 
relationship between economic base and superstructure. 
6 This would refer to how Adorno's theory is organised around the principle of 'state capitalism', after 
the' end of the liberal Bourgeois phase of market capitalism, marking 'the transition to centrally 
organised capitalism', as the next phase of domination. (Honneth, 1991: 76) 
7 Meaning 'cancels' (Pocket Oxford Dictionary), possibly a word that requires a more recent 
translation. 
S Translator James Schmidt explains that' Unmiindigkeit designates both "minority of age" 
(Minderjahrigkeit) and "legal or civil immaturity'" (Schmidt, WE: 63). 
9 The reference to tutelage possibly refers to the second sense of Unmiindigkei, designating 'minority 
of age', where 'tutelage' refers to guardianship, or being under instruction or tuition (Pocket Oxford 
Dictionary). 
10 Furthermore after the end of the liberal phase of market capitalism with which the public sphere is 
associated, Adorno fails to notice 'the obstacles to cultural-industrial manipulation ... or the 











Section 2: Kant's Moral-Political Enlightenment 
At the centre of Kant's political philosophy, and in fact his entire critical project is 
Kant's idea of freedom. This negative conception of 'Freedom' as idea makes it a fact 
of reason that exists as noumena, limited to the intelligible realm, which unlike the 
phenomena of nature and sensibility man cannot 'know', as in experience or 
understand through concepts. What Kant shows through careful deduction in the 
Critique oj Practical Reason is that freedom is at least a possibility. This is what 
Jerome Schneewind terms Kant's 'invention of autonomy' (Schneewind, 1997: 3). 
Paul Guyer also posits a unique Kantian moment: 'After he wrote, no one could ever 
again think of either science or morality as a matter of the passive reception of 
entirely external truth or reality' (Guyer, 1992: 10); after Kant the subject is no longer 
a spectator but the active agent in the creation of both the moral and physical worlds. 
This constitutes what Etienne Balibar will call 'the "invention" of the 'transcendental 
subject'l of reason whose autonomy requires the idea of its 'freedom' (Balibar, 36). It 
. is of this very success that Adorno and Horkheimer will accuse Kant. They read 
Kant's obligation to become 'enlightened', i.e. to exercise '[u]nderstanding without 
the guidance of another person' (DE, 1944: 81), as the practice of freedom from all 
moral obligation. 
This section will show how 'Freedom', or the possibility of freedom functions in 
relation to the conflict between politics and morality, or between (philosophical) 
theory and (political) practice in general, which will be shown for Kant to be the same 
conflict. It will be argued that Kant's political philosophy is in fact structured around 
the possibility or problem of a moral-politics, which will be shown to articulate itself 
as the tension between freedom as idea and freedom as a set of legislated rights. We 
will briefly outline the parameters of the Kantian moral-political problem as 
structured around the idea of freedom using Kant 's Political Writings. A close reading 
of the articles, 'An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?' (abbreviated: 
WE) and The Contest oJthe Faculties (abbreviated: CF) will show that Kant comes to 
two possible resolutions of the moral-political problem. The explicit solution to the 
conflict of morality with politics is 'publicity', and it will be shown that this informs 











different ways that they articulate the relationship between state and civil society. 
However, there is a second solution, which is in fact no solution. This will be shown 
to involve a very different conception of power and the philosopher's relationship to 
power that is closer to the critical thought of Michel Foucault and Adorno and 
Horkheimer. This is what we will call an 'internalisation' of the political principle 
within what Etienne Balibar calls the 'citizen subject'. This second reading follows 
the tracing of a subtextual antinomy within Kant's text on 'What is Enlightenment?', 
and then linking it to Balibar's article 'Citizen Subject'. A brief outline of these 
opposing solutions to the moral-political problem will conclude section 2. Section 3 
will work out in more detail the implications of a similarity between the critiques of 
Foucault, A-H and Kant's judgement of the French Revolution in CF. This link will 
be made via Kant's Critique of Aesthetic Judgement. 
A schematic synopsis of Kant's Categorical Imperative illustrates the 
interconnectedness of autonomy, reason and freedom in Kant's moral, that is 
practical, philosophy. 
Freedom and reason in the Categorical Imperative 
Kant formulates the moral law or the categorical imperative thus, 'I ought never to act 
except in such a way that I can also will the maxim of my action to be a universal 
law' (Paton, 1947: 73). What is striking about this, or what constitutes it as the unique 
Kantian moment is its formalism: to be moral means to act in accordance with a law 
made by your own action, and this action is only moral insofar as it is done without 
any end in mind except its own end. Only action done for the sake of duty is moral, 
performing an action as a means to some end, such as desire for happiness, is for Kant 
pathological. Only an action done out of the duty to be happy is moral. (Paton, 1947: 
85). A universal law is a priori, i.e. outside of or before sensuous experience or the 
desires of finite human existence; it is necessarily negative. The problem for men is to 
act autonomously from sensuai inclinations and merely in accordance with the mora) 
la\v. Acting in accordance with the moral law is inseparable from reason, the ability to 
be rational or reasonable, a priori, that is before sensual experience or desire, to which 











moral law is not an imperative since it is an action that immediately accords with 
reason, while for finite rational beings, like men, who are not free from desire or 
natural inclinations that cloud their reasoning, it is necessarily a command, an 'ought'. 
(P?ton, 1947: 84-6) Kant's aim in the Critique of Practical Reason is to justify the 
'Categorical Imperati ve', that is to justify the possibility 0 f moral action in humans 
despite the fact that they can only ever possess 'an imperfectly good will' (Paton, 
1947: 114), for they are not angels. 
The basis of the CI, or all morality is autonomy: autonomous reason has full control 
over passion. The problem is thus to show how the predicate, autonomy is connected 
to the subject, the imperfectly rational agent, the one subject to reason as well as 
sensuous experience. If this was an analytic proposition, then 'the predicate is 
contained in the subject-concept and can be derived by analysis of the subject-
concept' (Paton, 1947: 120), that is by working backwards from effects to causes or 
conditions. However, since 'the predicate is not contained in the SUbject-concept' 
(Paton, 1947: 122) this proposition is synthetic, and requires a third term to connect 
the moral subject, man, to the autonomy required for moral actions This refers to the 
possibility of what Kant calls 'synthetic a priori propositions', that is an argument 
whose validity can be asserted without, or prior to experience, but which nonetheless 
requires a third term to guarantee this validity. In the case of Pure Reason, the third 
term is the transcendental subject.2 The connection between autonomy and the moral 
will is made by 'freedom'. This is what guarantees the autonomy of reason. However, 
all Kant manages to do is to prove that freedom is a 'fact of reason', which is no 
empirical fact at all, but a negative, not excluded by the very nature of our positive 
experience, but never part of that phenomenal experience; it is noumena. Thus, a 
moral law can have no analytic deduction, but from the moral law it is possible to 
justify the presupposition that the rational will must be free to act morally. In other 
words, freedom is nothing more than a possibility. 
\Vby is 'freedom' political? 
H.J. Paton calls Kant a pioneer, because he 'separated the problem of freedom from 
its legal and theological setting' (Paton, 1947: 207) and made it dependent merely on 











contextualising Kant's work within a preceding history of moral philosophy makes a 
statement that contradicts this task: 'nothing can explain the creative leap that enabled 
Kant to invent the new principle he needed' (Schneewind, 1997: 492, italics mine). 
While Kant argues in his introduction that 
our experience of the morals ought to show us ... autonomy ... requires contracausal freedom 
... in the unique experience of the moral ought we are "given" a "fact of reason" that 
unquestionably shows us that we possess such freedom as members of a nownenal realm . 
. (Schneewind, 1997: 3) 
Schneedwind argues that Kant 'shows us no such thing'. So Schneewind 'will think of 
his version of autonomy as an invention rather than an explanation' (Schneewind, 
199: 73). It is not our aim here to take up directly the problems of Kant's 
transcendental deduction of practical reason, but rather to look at how Kant by 
separating this 'freedom' from the legal and the theological by making it reasonable, 
makes it indirectly political. 
Historian Reinhart Koselleck discusses the fonnation of the absolutist state on the 
European continent 'as a response to religious civil war' and how the 
resulting separation of politics and morals, as well as the increasing disinterest of the state ... 
in controlling private, individual conscience, created a possible foothold for the constitution of 
a new formation. "society". first apart from and later against the state. 
(cited by Cohen & Arato, 1992: 207) 
This rejection of politics was at the same time the establishment of a moral vantage 
point for criticising and judging politics. The moral pressure emanating from 
"society", created a whole system of values alternative to the established ones, and so 
could not avoid being a source of influence over action and therefore becoming an 
indirect fonn of political power: 'Morality was directly unpolitical, but exactly for 
this reason it could put an amoral state into question and thus become, after all, 
political, if indirectly so.' (Cohen & Arato, 1992: 208). Furthennore, this 'problem of 
freedom', while often only implicitly related to morality, was not unique to Kant's 











philosophy that can be connected loosely around the emergence of the modem 
democratic state and its counterparts, civil society and/or the capitalist private sphere. 3 
We will now trace how the negative conception of freedom, Kant's 'invention', so to 
speak structures his political thought, especially in relation to his 'Idea for a Universal 
History', which is where his political philosophy is joined with a particular 
philosophy of history. This moral-political problem will be shown to manifest itself as 
the problem of the relationship of theory to practice, which will be shown to be the 
problem of how philosophy articulates itself in relation to power. We will argue that 
Kant comes to an uneasy resolution of this moral-political problem, and that it is the 
twin themes of the philosophy of history and the relationship of philosophy to power, 
that carry it over into another realm, the aesthetic, which will be the canvas of our last 
section. 
The Problems with a Moral-Politics 
Kant fonnulates the problem of the state thus, to combine 'the greatest possible 
freedom' with 'the limits of this freedom in order that it can co-exist with the freedom 
of others' (Kant, UH: 46). Kant says 'man is an animal who needs a master ... for 
each one of them ... will always misuse his freedom ifhe does not have anyone above 
him to apply force to him as the laws should require it.' (Kant, UR: 46). Kant's 
solution is somewhat different from that of his contemporary political philosophers. 
Because he introduces freedom as a priori, or negative, into the practical, political 
realm 
With Kant the distinction between (at least) two ideas offreedom is made both concrete and 
consequential for any political theory. On the one hand, we have Freedom as the 
undetennined causality, a transcendental a priori necessary to think both rationality and 
morality .. , On the other hand, there are freedoms as a set of legislated rights and exemptions, 
(Tobias, 1998: 2) 
This tension between freedom as idea and legislated freedoms is what will structure 











Wolfgang Kersting shows the formal similarity of Kant's idea of the state and the 
categorical imperative. Kant's 'a priori justification of the state' is grounded on the 
logical dependence of his political philosophy on the categorical demands of morality. 
The basis of the state is a non-voluntaristic, 'originary contract', which makes the 
move from the state of nature to the civil state an obligation, an 'ought to', what 
Kersting calls Kant's 'obligation to civil society' (Kersting, 1992: 145). Rather than 
positing it as an historical moment where free individuals enter into a civil society, it 
is a 'document of reason'. It is the form of 'the state in general, i.e. the state as an 
idea, as it should be according to the pure principles of justice ... for each real union 
to a political society' (Kersting, 1992: 147-9). For Kersting this is 'the political 
counterpart to the moral imperative, the categorical imperative of state power, so to 
speak' (Kersting, 1992: 149). It is the binding principle of any historical ruler of any 
historical state 'to make his laws in such a way as they could have originated from the 
united will of a whole people' (Kersting, 1992:149). In other words for Kant the state 
remains an entirely negative category. 
Kersting then highlights the contradictions in the Kantian division of this 'ideal civil 
state'. These a priori principles of this lawful state (Rechtsstaat) reflect its three-fold 
division into: the freedom of every member of society as a human being, the equality 
of each with all others as subject, and the independence of each member of the 
commonwealth as citizen. Beginning with the freedom of the human being, as 
originary, the other two a priori categories of the civil state can be shown to 
contradict both the law of 'freedom' and their categorisation as a priori. While Kant 
both dehistoricises the independence of the citizen (by making it originary) as well as 
transcendentalising (by abstracting from the actual legislation of a general vote to the 
independence that is shown to precede it) he introduces contingent and particular 
conditions that restrict the idea of the citizen by basing it on class and property 
ownership. Similarly, the category of subject can be shown to ignore socio-economic 
inequality, while also making an exception of the sovereign from the law to which all 
are equally subject. 4 Kersting, calls this an 'ideological ... betrayal by the philosopher 
of his own rational principles' by raising a contingency (economic dependence) to the 
status of a priori principle. This is ultimately the Marxist critique of Kant whose 
political philosophy is just another defence of bourgeois property and power 











The failure to resolve these contradictions this paper would suggest is due to the 
unresolved tension between freedom as idea and freedom as historically contingent, 
this is the tension at the centre of Kant's political philosophy and which is constantly 
threatening to make its effects felt in this paper, the longer we delay our discussion of 
it. This is the tension between morality and politics, that is between freedom as idea 
(as necessarily transcendental law) and freedom as legislated, as embodied in the 
prince or the body of legislation that constitutes the 'general will' of the people. 
Finally, this will be argued to be the tension between theory and practice. 
Thus, Kant's moral and political philosophy, as we have been tracing it, both exist 
within the tension between theory and practice. The morality of an action can only be 
detennined in practice, according to whether it can be judged moral, while its motive 
remains unknown but has at least the possibility of being moral, or based on freedom. 
The political as modelled on the moral law, thus based on the 'freedom' of human 
beings (Kant's first category), can only be realised within the civil state as a set of 
coercive legislations, and is in fact already contingent on historically conditioned 
relations of power and ownership within the categories citizen and subject. While 
Kersting correctly calls the negative nature of freedom the 'vulnerable' part of Kant's 
moral and political philosophy, \lie must add to this the vulnerability of 'theory' in 
generaL For when Kant defends the place oftheory in practice he is defending both 
the role of morality in the realm of political action, and as I will show this is 
concomitant with the role of the philosopher within the civil state. 
Kant even published a polemic in reply (or on behalfof) the academy in general to the 
private individual ('man of affairs'), the statesman, and the 'man of the world' 
('cosmopolitan') who are 'united in attacking the academic ... on matters of theory' 
as either invalid in practice or completely unrelated to practice (Kant, TP: 63). His 
polemic directly links theory with the position of the philosopher, as we will show in 
our reading ofCF, and is directed against those who 'seek to relegate him to his 











'Idea of a Universal History': equivalence of Kant's Moral-Politics and his 
Universal History 
The idea of a universal history provides is an a priori rule, from which to judge the 
events of the past and the present, i.e. to evaluate 'the positive and negative 
achievements of nations and governments in relation to the cosmopolitan goal' (Kant, 
UH: 53). In Perpetual Peace, Kant refers to that progress of history towards the 
'eventual formation ofa world republic' (Kant, PP: 104), an 'international state' with 
the legislative power to prevent war (Kant, PP: 104-5). This 'cosmopolitical' end of 
history must remain at the level of theory, as the 'Idea of a Universal History', which 
guides the practice that can never yet be its actualisation. This 'idea of a Universal 
history' must necessarily remain unrealised and non-empirical, an assymptote to 
which progress always moves closer, but can never equal. Thus, the tension re-
emerges between freedom as realised in the historical process versus freedom as 
transcendental a priori of this process. 
Kant denies the necessity of empirical practical participation; rather the realisation of 
democratic legislation is not a democratic participatory process, but a simulation of 
this, a thought experiment applying the criteria of rationality and equality to any 
decision made by the sovereign. Kersting says: 
In respect of its political effectiveness, the united will of the people is freed by Kant from 
Rouseau's mooring of it to a democratic assembly and thus can as a law-giving maxim bring 
every form of sovereignty on to the course of justice (Kersting, 1992: 158). 
This sets up an opposition between the as yet unrealised rational republic, woven out 
of the pure laws of freedom, and the historically developed, contingent state, born of 
violence: a process of history where every moment is an imperfect realisation of the 
ideal-rational republic, which it nonetheless comes asymptotically closer to. 
This places emphasis on the 'originary contract' as an idea instead of fact or actual 
event; instead it provides an a priori standard, 'a rational principle for judging any 
lawful public constitution' (Kant, TP: 84-85). The principle by which to judge 











itself cannot be imposed upon it by the legislator either' (Kant, TP: 85). This could be 
called a legal categorical imperative and through it Kant subordinates practice to 
theory, via the latter's absolute negativity. Kant, however, allows for the need for 
'coercive authority': 'the conceivable way of executing the original idea in practice 
and hence inaugurating a state of right, is by force' (Kant, PP: 117), that is to overrule 
'the man of practice, to whom morality is pure theory' (Kant, PP 1970: 116-7). Thus, 
to realise morality in politics, mere 'theory' is not sufficient. While Kant recognises 
the dangers in this he sees such despotism as a necessary stage on the way to the 
realisation of the rational republic, 
[AJ state may well govern itself in a Republican way, even if its existing constitution provides 
for a despotic ruling power, it will gradually come to the stage where the people can be 
influenced by the mere idea of the law's authority, just as if it were backed up by physical 
force (Kant, PP: lIS). 
By making the legislation of freedom, its actual historical (and thus weakened) 
realisation in the form of coercive power a necessary moment within his philosophy 
of history the tension between freedom as idea and as legislated re-surfaces. What is 
to happen in these cases where there is a discord between theory and practice, i.e. 
where political action deviates from moral theory? In this event Kantian 'freedom' 
does not extend to the right to revolt, or to use coercive force on the head of state to 
achieve the rational state, Kant is morally against the right to revolution. 
The negative status of both the general will and perpetual peace to which history 
comes ever closer but never reaches are the formal equivalents of Kant's formal moral 
law, based on freedom as negative. How are we to achieve 'freedom' if we can only 
imagine it? Ifwe can imagine it why can't we act, i.e. revolt against its imperfect 
realisation? How is the general will achieved 'a priori', that is without any valid 
system of representation? How are we then to relate these negative theoretical 
foundations of the state to the actual, positive definition given to it by Kant in his 
lengthy exposition of the Republican state, its division of powers, its relationship to 
property and the sovereignty of the prince, or the rights of ciIizens versus subjects in 











Perhaps Kant's solution to this antinomy lies here: 
The Secret Article of Perpetual Peace: the maxims of the philosopher on the conditions under 
which public peace is possible shall be consulted by states which are armed for war ... [that 
is] the state will invite their help silently, making a secret of it. (Kant, PP: 1970: 115) 
While Kant (in theory) consolidates freedom as a theory that is already essentially 
practical because it is 'absolutely binding' on political action: 'can only do what we 
ought to do' (Kant, PP: 1970: 116), in practice he sets up the philosopher as (secret) 
practitioner of the moral law whose role is to guide the actions of the state towards 
morality. Is it thus that Arendt concludes: 'morality can cut through the knot which 
politics cannot untie' (Arendt, 1982: 125). Kant takes up the problem of the position 
of the philosopher in relation to power in the 'Conflict of the Faculties'. We will look 
closely at his discussion centring on the defining event of Modernity, to which it 
could be said the enlightenment was always leading, and which all ideals of the 
modem democratic state lead from: the French Revolution. We must keep in mind 
that Kant is always morally against revolution. 
The Contest of the Faculties 
In the 'Contest of the Philosophy Faculty with the Faculty of Law', Kant asks the 
question: 
Is the human race constantZv progressing/improving? 
It is now that his Philosophy of History, previously at the service of his moral politics 
to condemn the right to revolution, plays instead the devil's advocate. 
This paper is introduced to us as a defence of the 'lower' faculty of philosophy from 
the so-called 'higher faculties' (Theology, Law, Medicine). The latter are shown to be 
intertwined with the business of state, while the philosophical faculty must necessarily 
remain separate from power since it must judge the teaching of the other faculties 
without being influenced by the interests of power. At the same time these higher 











However, 'it is legitimate for the philosophy faculty to question the findings of the 
higher faculties. To do so does not imply criticism of the government; it involves 
merely a contest between the faculties (though not a war) about what is true' (Kant, 
CF: 176). This section concerns the conflict of the philosophy faculty with the faculty 
oflaw, present implicitly rather than explicitly, in Kant's attempt to answer the 
question he poses. 6 
Kant deals with this problem of finding' a history a priori', which does not deal with 
the past, 'but a history of future times' (Kant, CF: 177). He dismisses other such 
'prognosticative or prophetic' revelations, as well as any kind of scientific method 
(Kant, CF: 177-81). He recognises that instead such judgement 'must ... start from 
some experience' (Kant, CF: 181). In human affairs, 
there must be some experience or other which, as an event which has actually occurred, might 
suggest that man has the quality and power of being the cause and (since his actions are 
supposed to be those of a being endowed with freedom) the author of his 0\\11 improvement. 
(Kant, CF: 181) 
This event would constitute an 'historical sign ... to prove the existence of a tendency 
within the human race as a whole, considered not as a series of individuals ... but as a 
body distributed over the earth in states and national groups.' (Kant, CF: 181) Kant 
does find' [a]n occurrence in our times which proves this moral tendency of the 
human race' (Kant, CF: 182): the French revolution. Kant never explicitly names it, or 
its participants or events, merely referring to it as '[t]he revolution which we have 
seen taking place in our own times in a nation of gifted people.' (Kant, CF: 182) What 
is important to Kant is not the disappearance of 'ancient and illustrious states' nor the 
'momentous deeds or misdeeds of men'. Its significance has 'nothing to do with all 
this' . 
We are here concerned only with the attitude of the onlookers as it reveals itself in public 
while the drama of great political changes is taking place: for they openly express universal 
yet disinterested sympathy for one set of protagonists against their adversaries, even at the risk 
that their partiality could be of great disadvantage to themselves. Their reaction (because of its 
universality) proves that mankind as a whole shares a certain character in common, and it also 












makings of one. And this does not merely allow us to hope for human improvement; it is 
already a form of improvement in itself, in so far as its influence is strong enough for the 
present. 
This revolution has aroused in the hearts and desires of all spectators who are not themselves 
caught up in it a sympathy which borders almost on enthusiasm, although the very utterance of 
this sympathy was fraught with danger. It cannot therefore have been caused by anything 
other than a moral disposition within the human race. (Kant, CF: 182·3) 
Not only has Kant just contradicted his moral disagreement with revolution but he has 
just made a revolution the very ground, empirical and not transcendental, of proof that 
'man has a moral character' (Kant, CF: 182). What has happened, can we take this as 
a softening of the moral position in Kant's old age (the last large work Kant published 
in his lifetime)? The answer for such good Kantians as ourselves is of course, no. 
Immediately, what seems to have been resolved by this 'event' is a practice that 
accords with the 'theory' of a moral pohtics, meeting both its requirements of 
originary freedom and of achieving perpetual peace. However, as soon as practice 
accords with theory, Kant re-enacts the tension between them, re-enacting so to speak 
the absolute negativity of freedom at the centre of his moral politics. As usual the 
contradiction between theory and practice is implicit, for while Kant defines right as 
'the right of every people to give itself a ci viI constitution of the kind that it sees fit, 
vvithout interference from other powers', in a footnote Kant qualifies this: 'This does 
not mean, however, that a people which has a monarchic constitution can thereby 
claim the right to alter it, or even a secret desire to do so.' (Kant, CF: 182) 
The latter historical, contingent and particular event is transcendentalised as 'sign' of 
the moral improvement of humanity towards the goal of Kant's Universal Idea of 
history. As is to be expected Kant backtracks from what this implies in practice: a 
right to revolution. He sort of censors himself after the bad word has escaped. He 
explains that it is 
not, however, a phenomenon of revolution, but ... of evolution of a constitution governed by 











would be administered by a single ruler [the monarch] acting by analogy with the laws which 
a people would give itself in conformity with universal principles of right. ' (Kant, cf: 184, 
italics mine) 
Here and in another footnote Kant emphasises that 'right' must remain at a formal 
level, while the monarch rules as if the people were co-legislators, that is the people 
rule but only by analogy: their 'rights ... always remain an idea which can be fulfilled 
only on condition that the means employed to do so are compatible with morality. 
This limiting condition must not be overstepped by the people, who may therefore not 
pursue their rights by revolution, which is at all times unjust' (Kant, CF: 184, FN*). 
How is Kant's ambiguity in his attitude to the French revolution to be explained? 
While Kant may have disguised a more radical position within this moral language as 
pre-emptive counter to censorship7, Peter p. Nicholson's analysis of Kant's 
contradictory attitudes to the French Revolution shows these to be part of two 
different discourses, respectively: Kantian moral-juridical theory and Kant's 
philosophy of history (Nicholson, 1992: 250). Here the philosophy of history, this 
time as a history of the future, plays devil's advocate, by taking the French Revolution 
as 'sign' confirming Kant's entire philosophy of history, of progress towards the ideal 
rational republic, or the achievement of perpetual peace. However, two phrases which 
Kant italicises in this discussion: 'in public' and 'sympathy' hint at more than just a 
theoretical-discursive, but a practical solution to the 'problem' ofrevolution. Kant 
emphasises that it is the response to the event of the spectators that determines the 
meaning of the revolution. This response is not one of action- i.e. joining the 
revolution or enacting it on one's own state, but it is a response of 'disinterested 
sympathy' from the sidelines. Finally, it is 'public', it is expressed universally by all 
of its spectators, in all 'states and national groups' (Kant, CF: 181), the entire 
'external pubhc of onlookers sympathised ... without the slightest intention of 
actively participating' (Kant, Cf: 183). Thus amalgamating the two italicised words, it 
is this idea of public sympathy that qualifies Kant's judgement of the revolution not as 
morally right, for he still condemns its actors, but as a sign of morality within his 
philosophy of history. What exactly Kant means by 'publicity' and 'sympathy' and 
whether these untie the 'knot' of politics and morality or theory and practice will be 











the moral-political problem takes within Hannah Arendt's Lectures on Kant's 
Political Philosophy. 
Kant must necessarily limit the freedom he has approved of, and to do so he 
reintroduces the dialectic of freedom as legislated in law and as philosophical idea. 
Thus, freedom in all these instances is suspended between the two faculties, the 
conflict of which is the title of this section. While the paper is called 'The Philosophy 
Faculty versus the Faculty of Law', Kant hardly makes any explicit reference to the 
latter and I would argue that this is because the real polemic is between philosophy 
and the state. I would argue that the conflict oflaw (as in the state) and philosophy 
arises in what we will refer to as both a polemic and dialectic of freedom as legislated 
versus transcendental. It is 'publicity', as the maxim of the moral-politics, that 
attempts to resolve this' conflict'. 
Popular Enlighteners or menace to the state? 
A close reading of this passage from 'Conflict of the Faculties' will prove instructive 
on the above point. 
Popular Enlightenment is the public instruction of the people upon their duties and rights 
towards the state to \vrnch they belong. Since this concerns only natural rights and rights 
which can be derived from ordinary common sense, their obvious exponents and interpreters 
among tile people will not be officials appointed by the state, but free teachers of rights, i.e. 
the philosophers. The latter, on account of the very freedom which they allow themselves, are 
a stumbling-block to the state, whose only wish is to rule; they are accordingly given the 
appellation of 'enlighteners', and decried as a menace to the state. And yet they do not address 
themselves in familiar tones to the people (who themselves take little or no notice of them or 
their writings), but in respectful tones to the state, which is thereby implored to take the 
rightful needs of the people to heart, And if a whole people wishes to present its grievance ... , 
the only way this can be done is by publicity. A ban on pUblicity will therefore hinder a 
nation's progress, even with regard to the least of its claims, the claim for natJlfal rights, 
(Kant, CF: 186) 
While Kant calls philosophers the' free teachers of rights', popular enlighteners 
concerned with teaching the people 'their duties and rights towards the state', in the 











state. The 'ordinary common sense' of the people to which he attributes the 
understanding of rights and duties instead of the state, allows Kant to wrest this 
understanding from officials of the state (the legislators of its laws). However, now 
the. polemic is not of philosophy versus law, or people versus state, it is entirely 
between the state and the philosopher, who addresses the state directly. This tum 
away from the people seems to be a defence strategy against the state's criticism of 
these 'enlighteners ... decried as a menace to the state'. So what Kant suggests, and 
this is evident in his phrasing, 'and yet they do not address themselves directly to the 
people' (italics mine), is I would suggest a kind of compromise, an exchange that 
would benefit both the state and ensure the position of the philosopher within the 
state. In other words Kant could have phrased it thus, 'while the philosopher as 
enlightener of the people on their true rights could become a menace to the state by 
addressing itself in familiar tones to the people it chooses instead ... respectful tones 
to the state'. In this compromise, the philosopher does not merely abandon the people, 
for the philosopher is able to represent the 'grievances' of the people, its 'rightful 
needs' to the state.s When Kant says that 'publicity' is the only way for 'a whole 
people ... to present its grievance', it could be argued that this is not a representative 
'public opinion', but a representation of the 'general will' by analogy: 'they should 
treat the people in accordance with principles akin in spirit to the laws of freedom 
which a people of mature rational powers would prescribe for itself, even if the people 
is not literally asked for its consent' (Kant, CF: 187). So I would argue that while 
making 'publicity,9 (of grievances and of rights) the condition for progress towards 
the rational republic, this does not necessarily give the people the right to address the 
state, but only the philosopher who must defend his position between the people and 
the state, as mediator. 10 
Although this reading seems to suggest that Kant reduces all rights to publicity to the 
philosopher proper, as mediator between state and people; my reading of an earlier 
paper, which also deals with publicity and the relation of philosophy to the state, 
suggests otherwise. In An Answer to the Question: f¥hat is Enlightenment? Kant 
defines the public position as the place for philosophising in general as opposed to the 
exclusive domain of the philosopher. It is a 'place' for theory (and for freedom to 
theorise morality) within political practice. It is thus that we can make a link in CF 











criterion for his judgement of the French Revolution. It is not a link that Kant himself 
makes, but I would argue is implicit in CF. Kant isolates a separate realm of 
spectatorship, a kind of world public, which express a 'disinterested sympathy' 
bordering on enthusiasm for the revolution, despite the immorality of its actions or its 
practice. Kant makes their judgement ofthis historical event in theory and in public 
the locus of its real moral-political meaning. In other words a link (albeit implicit) can 
be made from this realm of 'public sympathy' to the mediative role of 
'publicness'/publicity that Kant negotiates for the philosophy faculty with the state 
(law). 
In other words far from being exclusive to the philosophy faculty within the state, 
Kant's discussion of the revolution implies that the position of judgement on the state 
or on the events of history is in fact open to the public, literallyl). To trace out this 
implicit link between 'publicity', judgement and philosophy it is necessary to go back 
to an article which tackles this constellation explicitly, what could be termed the most 
political of all Kant's ""'fitings. It is an article whose title poses the question 'What is 
Enlightenment?' The answer will be discussed in relation to several other readings at 
length: Foucault's 'What is Enlightenment?' and Etienne Balibar's 'Citizen-Subject'. 
This reading will lead us back to that other text onlofthe Enlightenment, the dialectic 
from which we began, if only indirectly. Hannah Arendt links 'publicness', as the 
condition for a moral politics, to Kant's idea of 'disinterested sympathy' within his 
aesthetics to show how Kant's unwritten political philosophy is ultimately located in 
his Critique of Aesthetic Judgement. It is this theoretical knot of the aesthetic and the 
political that we aim to untie in our final chapter. It will be shown to contain the 
hidden thread that leads us back to the philosophy of history in the Dialectic. By then 
we hope to have gained a more mature perspective or at least the wisdom of hindsight. 
An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment? 
This is a less polemical, but perhaps more broadly political, account of 'publicness'. 
Instead of limiting the 'public' to the philosopher as mediator between the poles of 
people and state, Kant defines it much more broadly to include anyone that makes 











restricted to the scholar but is defined as 'that use which anyone makes of it [reason] 
as a scholar [Gelehrter] before the entire public of the reading world'. In other words 
anyone, any member of the people (at least theoretically) is able to make 'public use 
of his own reason', provided he can read and write Kant is not defending the position 
of the philosopher within the state, rather he is defending the right to philosophise, as 
in to reason freely, to 'have the courage to use your own understanding! '(Kant, WE: 
58). For Kant this is the motto of enlightenment, which he defines as 'mankind's exit 
from its self-incurred immaturity' (Kant, WE: 58). It is thus that I will begin to 
address Adorno and Horkheimer's reduction of all Kantian reason to instrumental 
reason, which is universal and autonomous. I will show, however, that the 'free use' 
of one's own understanding, or reason is not, however, without restrictions on its 
obligatory 'universality'. In fact Kant puts particular, political conditions on reason 
that formulate the moral-political problem in terms very close to the dialectical 
method they use to place Kant together with Sade. 
'Here freedom is restricted everywhere', says Kant. While it is unlikely that the 
individual man will free himself from his 'immaturity', 'that a public [Publikum] 
should enlighten itself is more likely ... if only it is granted freedom' (Kant, WE: 59). 
Kant having essentially answered his initial question poses a further question. Having 
defined what enlightenment is, he now asks what the condition for enlightenment is: 
'r answer: the public use of reason must at all times be free, and it alone can bring 
about enlightenment among men. '(Kant, WE: 59). However, there is a condition on 
this freedom to reason, 'the private use of reason, however, may often be very 
narrowly restricted without the progress of enlightenment being particularly hindered' 
(Kant, WE: 59-60). Thus, within the 'private' sphere as Kant defines it, 
one is certainly not allowed to argue; rather one must obey. But insofar as this part of the 
machine considers himself at the same time as a member of the commonwealth, indeed even 
of a cosmopolitan society, who in the role of a scholar addresses a public in the proper sense 
through his writings, he can certainly argue without thereby harmmg the affairs in which he is 
engaged as a passive member.'(Kant, WE: 60, italics mine), 12 
Thus, each person is at the same time member of a 'private' sphere and a 'public' 











questioning them, in much the same way Adorno and Horkheimer discuss the unself-
conscious application of reason as a system. Simultaneously, he has a public 
existence, not limited to a nation state or to his profession, whether soldier, clergyman 
or civil servant, but 'cosmopolitan', or 'namely the world' (Kant, WE: 61). Here 
where he plays (for lack of a better word) 'the role of scholar' he is able to express his 
opinion freely, but only in 'writing': he is able actively to 'argue' against the very 
things he 'passively' carries out in his other 'private' role. Kant gives a few examples 
of the 'double life' that this implies. The soldier, who must obey, can later 'make 
remarks on failings in the military service ... before the public for judgement', or the 
citizen who must pay tax but who 'does not act against the duty of a citizen ifhe, as a 
scholar, expresses his thoughts publicly on the ... injustice of such taxes' (Kant, WE: 
60). In each case the private and public use of reason must be allowed to coexist, 
requiring a member of the state to lead a kind of double life. I will show how this 
double existence becomes the condition for Kant's resolution of the moral-political 
problem. 
Spiritual Freedom and The Spirit of Freedom: the conditions for a double life 
The double life to which Kant gives most attention is that of the 'clergyman', or as he 
admits, 'I have placed the main point of enlightenment - mankind's exit from its self-
imposed immaturity primarily on religious matters ... because this type of 
immaturity is the most hannful' (Kant, \VE: 62-3). Kant's lengthy discussion of 
unenlightened religious authority, which he at one point calls 'ecclesiastical 
despotism', is the most polemical point of the short article. Close analysis of it will 
bring much insight. 
Kan is extremely critical of the unalterable symbols of the church that disallow for 
change, he calls this 'a crime against human nature, whose original destiny consists in 
this progress' (Kant, WE: 61). He moves from this particular example to the 
generalised idea of freedom: 'The touchstone of everything that can be concluded as a 
law for the people lies in the question: could a people have imposed such a law upon 
itself?'(Kant, WE: 61). This, I would argue, makes all freedom, as in the generalized, 
or transcendental freedom at the basis of what we have called Kant's moral politics, 
.. 











based on freedom would look: 'all citizens, especially the clergy, would be left free, 
in their capacities as scholars- that is, through writings to make remarks on the 
failings of the current institutions ... until insight into the nature of these things 
became so pUblic ... they could bring a resolution before the throne, to take those 
congregations into protection who had united into an altered religious organisation 
... without hindering those who wish to remain with the old.'(Kant, WE: 61) 
Following this logical demonstration of the rationalisation of religion, Kant argues 
(which suggests 'argues against') any form of 'ecclesiastical despotism': 'it is 
absolutely forbidden to unite, even for the lifetime of a single man, in a permanent 
religious constitution that no one may publicly doubt ... [this] is to violate and to 
trample on the sacred rights of mankind' (Kant, WE: 61-62), 
Kant now switches from the discussion of religion to the monarch, but if we read 
carefully what is easily glossed over, Kant only addresses the head of state, be it on a 
first name basis as 'Frederick', indirectly through 'religious matters'. It is thus 
couched in the language of religion, matters of the soul, that Kant writes a 'scarcely 
veiled ... contract' (Foucault, 1984: 37), which he presents for the monarch, who may 
because he is often guilty of 'finding the writings through which his subjects seek to 
put their insights into order worthy of governmental oversight' (Kant, WE: 62) 
inadvertantly use his unsteady hand to sign it. 
I will now provide evidence of this interpretation, if only to show its cunning. Kant 
says of the monarch: 'If only he sees to it that all true or alleged improvements are 
consistent with civil order, he can allow his subjects to do what they find necessary 
for the well-being of their souls. That does not concern him ... ' What does concern 
the monarch is to allow the people to 'argue' and debate publicly, that is in writing, 
about these 'religious matters': 
'A prince who does not find it unworthy of himself to say that he regards it as a duty to 
prescribe nothing to men regarding reJigious matters but rather to allow them full freedom in 
this area ... is himself enlightened ... Under him the venerable clergy, in their role as scholars 
and irrespective of their official duties, freely and publicly present their judgements and 
insights ... to the we rid for examination. Those who are not restricted by the duties of office 
are even freer. This spirit of freedom spreads even further, even where it must struggle with 











example to such a government that public peace and unity have little to fear from this 
freedom. '(Kant, 1970: 62, ilalics mine). 
This is an 'enlightening', or should we say illuminating, paragraph. It follows from 
Kant's veneration of Frederick not under the 'haughty title of tolerant' but as 
enlightened, in fact Kant's pandering goes so far as to call his century 'the age of 
enlightenment or the century of Frederick' (Kant, WE: 62). However, the extent of 
Frederick's 'tolerance' becomes clear in this paragraph, he has allowed 'full freedom' 
only in 'religious matters, and that is only in the scholar~v writings of the clergy. In all 
other matters it seems that the government 'misunderstands itself, and Kant subtly 
accuses the government or its officials of restricting freedom of expression. 13 
Nonetheless, what is important is for us is that Kant uses religious freedom, or the 
free public use of reason in religious matters as an 'illuminating example' that such 
freedom in all other spheres of the state would not threaten 'public peace and unity'. 
In other words Kant makes a logical argument: if the freedom of the public exercise 
of reason in religion has thus far not threatened the authority of the government, then 
neither will public freedom in all other areas. 
The logical dependence of freedom on 'spiritual freedom', as both necessarily prior to 
and exemplary of the former is further consolidated: 
the marmer of thinking of a head of state \vho favours such ellliglllenment [i.e. 'spiritual 
feedom'] goes even further and sees that even with regard to his own legislation there is no 
danger in allowing his subjects to make public use of their reason and to lay publicly before 
the world their ... candid criticism of laws already given ... '(Kant. WE: 63). 
Whether Kant's naming of Frederick as a 'shining example' of this is mere flattery or 
actuality is a question for historians 14. However, what we are arguing here is that a 
polemic against 'ecclesiastical despotism' can be shown to address the state or the 
monarch as head of state indirectly, and to make a direct logical connection between 
'spiritual freedom' and the 'spirit of freedom'. Logically, 'freedom' in all matters of 
state, but specifically freedom to legislate follows from religious freedom. Religious 
freedom has two meanings, one a-historical and one historical. For Kant it is the 











'despotism' of all authority. Historically, however, it could be linked to the separation 
of church and state, a condition for the modem democratic state is its secularisation 
and, as a result or condition for this, religion becomes a private matter. 
Reinhart Koselleck's discusses the separation of morality and politics in the formation 
of the absolutist European state 'as a response to religious civil war' (Cohen & Arato, 
1992: 207). Kant writes in that historical moment between absolute monarchy, which 
subordinates religion to the state and the modem secular state, which completes the 
separation of religion and state. We do not want to undermine the complexities of 
these historical formations but to point to them as the context of Kant's thought. For 
Koselleck the 'Religious Peace of Augsburg' made peace independent of religious 
belief and thus war between religious believers became war between states. This 
compromise, implying the privatisation of religious belief, and thus of morality, is the 
condition for the emergence of 'politics.' (Koselleck, 1985: 8). The significance of 
Kant's historical context is that it becomes inseparable from that context, for he 
directs his critique to his present: the 'Age of Enlightenment' and the French 
Revolution, respectively. Kant's moral-political judgement of the French Revolution 
in CF, as the defining historical event of the transition to the modem secular state will 
become important when we attempt to work out its conditions in section 3. It is then 
that we will tum to Michel Foucault, who reads this as the unique moment at which 
philosophy directs itself to its present, to revolution and enlightenment. It is thus that 
a particularly historical relationship between critique, the philosophy of history and 
the revolution will be revealed. For now, let us return to the text of WE, after this 
brief excursion into its historical context; which suggests that we never really left. 
Contract or Double Deal? 
Michel Foucault calls Kant's article 'a thinly disguised contract'. Now, the reasons for 
Kant's flattery and cunning become apparent: he wishes to make a deal with power. 
The monarch has the thing Kant wants, freedom that is public in its very essence for it 
demarcates the public realm, the realm ofpower15, and all that Kant has to give in 
return is his 'private' passivity, as subject to that power. The ruler must grant freedom 
in the public exercise of reason in exchange for obedience in the private exercise of 











Enlightenment, marked by 'passivity' and the use of reason as the 'rules and fonnula, 
these mechanical instruments of rational use' (Kant, WE: 59). The words of the 
contract are: 'argue, as much as you want and about whatever you want, only obey!' 
Kant 'exchanges' with Frederick: private obedience for public freedom, or does he? 
Now, something interesting occurs in translation. The translated version refers to 
'a strange and unexpected tendency in human affairs ... almost paradoxical. A high 
degree of civic freedom appears as advantageous to the spiritual freedom ... of a 
people and yet it places before it insuperable restrictions; a lesser degree of civil 
freedom, in contrast creates room for spiritual freedom to spread to its full capacity' 
(Kant, WE: 63, italics mine). 
In this last 'paradoxical' fonnulation Kant kind of transcendentalises the very 
practical, historical contract he has just demonstrated. Initially, he demonstrates in an 
underhand sort of way that Frederick being so enlightened as to have already allowed 
for religious freedom in exchange for private obedience has thus, according to the 
logic of Kant's argument (as demonstrated), already begun the process of granting 
that freedom in all spheres, specifically the freedom to legislate. In other words 
Frederick has already signed the contract with which he is presented: 'spiritual 
freedom' is already the' spirit of freedom'. 
Let us take the risk of doing a slightly more radical reading of Kant's articulation of 
state power and freedom here, let us look carefully at the tenns of his carefully 
worded contract with power, hopefully not entirely lost in translation. Our reading 
emphasises that what is important is a splitting of the member of state into two 
spheres of existence, into both subject (as in the one who obeys legislation) and 
citizen (the one who legislates his own freedom). 16 In the final fonnulation spiritual 
freedom is made dependent on the passivity in the realm of the 'civil' or biirgerlich, 
and this is made into a rule of 'human affairs ... generally', and not just in the state 
ruled by Frederick in 1784. Previously, Kant makes private obedience his bartering 
tool, the thing he exchanges for what the king has: public freedom, which would 
explain his inversion of tenns 'public' I'private'. I would argue that now he takes both 
'commodities' (for lack of a better word) out of any kind of exchange relation 











of the state, i.e. as citizens and subjects. The contract is no longer between the public 
power of the Monarch and its subjects but rather the ruler is somewhat taken out of 
the equation, like the historical contingency Kant is attempting to supercede by 
making a general, or universal rule, what he calls 'a tendency in human affairs'. So 
we are back at the tension between legislated freedom and freedom as idea, now 
finally articulated as a split and tension no longer in relation to the sovereign or the 
law of the state, but I would argue within what Etienne Balibar calls, the 'sovereign 
subject', or 'citizen subject'. We will discuss Balibar's article in detail shortly. 
For now however, the possibility of a second reading emerges. Comparison of the 
translation and Kant's original prove instructive on this. The translated version 
contains a slippage from 'civic freedom' to 'civil freedom'. Kant's original contains 
no such nuance, in both cases Kant refers to 'btirgerlicher Freiheit': 
'Ein grosserer Grad btirgerlicher Freiheit scheint der Freiheit des Geistes des Yolks 
vorteilhaft, und setzt ihr doch untibersteigliche Schranken; ein Grad weniger von jener 
verschafft hingegen diesem Raum, sich nach allem seinen Yermogen auszubreiten.' 
(Kant, WE: 61). Kant merely refers in the second half of his proposition to 
'btirgerliche Freiheit' 17 using the demonstrative pronoun 'jener'. Why does the 
translator James Schmidt take the licence of in the first case discussing 'civic 
freedom' and in the second 'civil freedom'? 
My search for a differentiated usage of the terms 'civil' and 'civic' in early modem 
political theory came to almost nothing l8 . While now we might take 'civic' as 
referring to the state, and 'civil' as associated with that which falls outside the direct 
control of the state: civil society, civilian, civil liberties versus civic duties 19• Before 
Hegel, the terms 'civil' and 'civic' are often used interchangeably to refer to the 
political or the state and society in general. There is little evidence of a separation into 
(civic) state and (civil) society until after Hegel, who Cohen and Arato argue provides 
a 'synthesis' of previous thought to provide 'the first modem theory of civil society' 
(Cohen & Arato, 1992: 91). When Hobbes, or Adam Fergusson or Locke refer to 
'civil society' they use the term normatively to describe a good state or a civilised, 
whether liberal or Republican?O While the discourse of a modem civil society 
separate from the state does emerge from this early political philosophy it is really 











state. While Kant's political philosophy anticipates this, it is difficult to read 
'BUrgerliche Freiheit' as Hegel's 'BUrgerliche Gesellsschaft'. 21 While BUrger later 
takes on the meaning of Bourgeois22 this early usage tended to denote citizen, or 
Staatsbiirger (Sheehan, 1989: 71). 
It is not really possible to discern a motive in this slippage from civic to civil in the 
translation, it is also too simplistic to dismiss it as mere mistranslation.23 It may be 
symptomatic of two different understandings of the Modem political' contract' of the 
citizen: with power and with himself. This projection of a more Modem 
understanding onto Kant's differentiation of public and private reason, implies that 
Kant anticipates the emergence of civil society, or a society separate from the civic 
state. Thus, in this case the restriction of 'civil liberties ' has as its condition the 
exercise of ' civic freedom', that is the coercive power of the state. The slippage is 
symptomatic of the main problem of the modem political philosophy: to balance 
'civic duty' with 'civil liberties' , that is the power of the state and the freedom of civil 
society. Kant's 'Republicanism' would emphasise the necessity of the state, whose 
role would be to maintain civil liberty; liberalism would rather emphasise the freedom 
of civil society against the state, the power of which must be limited. For Habermas's 
normative critique of civil society Kant's inversion of the terms public and private is 
evidence of the importance of an emerging public sphere to playa mediating, that 
would be a Kantian moral, role, between society and state. 24 In other words in the 
translated version, the contract occurs between the newly emergent society and the 
state, of which it, the people, is sovereign of the state that represents it, but must be 
separate from it. All modem political philosophy concerns the negotiation of a kind of 
contract between the state and (civil) society, from which the absolute monarch is 
ultimately removed. Cohen and Arato trace the conceptual history of the term civil 
society, and the normative critiques of Hannah Arendt and JUrgen Habermas, as well 
as the genealogical critique of Michel Foucault. These discussions are take as their 
starting point a basic dualism of state/civil society as determining modem politics. 
These thinkers define the terms of their arguments, such as public/private, public 
sphere, society, liberal, republican or disciplinary power, in terms of this dualism. We 












We have traced the tension between freedom as legislated and as idea throughout its 
various resolutions in Kant's project for a moral politics. It is resolved via the maxim 
of publicity, at first seemingly restricted as the right of philosophy, and finally 
generalised into the free 'public use of reason', accessible to all who wish to exercise 
this right, provided that freedom is restricted in its private use. There are two readings 
of this resolution. The one traces the emergence of Modem state power and civil 
society, and the need to mediate between the two by a public sphere. The other 
reading is riskier. It risks reducing this coexistence of 'public/private' within the 
state/civil society to each individual member of that state, as the immanent or 
internalised condition of double existence within the modem state, that is as 
simultaneously 'citizen' and 'subject', public and private being. Thus, the contract is 
between 'citizen' and 'subject', rather than between 'subject' and 'sovereign', or 
citizen and state. Etienne Balibar's 'Citizen Subject' delineates this doubled 
political/moral existence as the particularly modem phenomenon. For him it emerges 
simultaneously with the French Revolution, and so Balibar's discussion will take us 
back to Kant's discussion of this singularly Modern event. This paper does not 
presume to call ourselves Modem, or to take for granted that after the French 
Revolution comes Modernity. Our lack of historical evidence of either the event or the 
era or their connection to an episteme is due to the fact that our aim is in fact to work 
out the relationship between critical thought and history, or its own historical moment 
of production within that era called Modernity. Our ellipses and constant references to 
time will become apparent in the end, for it is then that a particular relationship 
between Modern knowledge and revolution will be articulated as a philosophy of 
history. Balibar points out that the emergence of the 'citizen subject' is contingent on 
the historical event of the 'French Revolution'. It is this contingency to which we now 
turn. 
The 'citizen subject' and the Revolution 
Balibar's discussion of modern subjectivity depends on a distinction between 
'subjectum', 'subjectus' and 'citizen'. While 'subjectus' refers to being 'subject to' 
some higher authority/sovereignty, sUbjectum seems to be closest to what we 
understand to be modern subjectivity, as an independent, self-consciousness. Balibar's 











conspicuously absent25 . Balibar blames the confusion of the Modern 'subjectum' and 
the 'subjectus' on the 'effect ... of Kantian philosophy', that is on its critical 'turn'. 
To re-quote: 
'We must return to the very letter of the Critique of Pure Reason if we are to discover the 
origin of the projection of a transcendental category of the "subject" upon the Cartesian text. 
This projection and the distortion it brings with it ... is in itself constitutive of the "invention" 
of the transcendental subject' (Balibar, 1991: 36). 
For Balibar this consists of a double-move: first Kant discovers the subject in the 
(relationaI26) substance of the Cartesian cogito, and second denounces that substance 
as 'transcendental illusion' (Balibar, 1991: 36). For Balibar then this constitutes the 
modern subject's paradoxical 'being and nonbeing, in any case not a thing, not 
categorisable, not objectifiable' (Balibar, 1991: 37), epistemologically it is what 
effects the 'unity of the conditions of experience' and practically via the categorical 
imperative it 'inscribes freedom in nature' (Balibar, 1991: 37). 
To work out the contradictions of the subject, Balibar ventures an answer to Jean Luc 
Nancy's 'sophistic question': 'Who comes after the subject?'(Balibar, 1991: 37). He 
explains: [A]fter the subject comes the citizen' (Balibar, 1991: 38) or the 'citizen 
(defined by his rights and duties) is that "non-subject" who comes after the subject [as 
in sllbjectllS] , and whose constitution and recognition put an end (in principle) to the 
subjection of the subject' (Balibar, 1991: 39). Here Balibar historicises the Kantian 
notion of the subject, and also the notion of 'freedom' or 'autonomy', which is the 
condition of its 'invention'. Balibar reduces Kant's philosophical 'turn' to the 
'rupture' of the French Revolution, it is more than "'coincidence": the moment at 
which Kant produces and retrospectively projects the transcendental "subject" is 
precisely that moment at which politics destroys the "subject" of the prince, in order 
to replace him with the repUblican citizen.' (Balibar, 1991: 39). Balibar traces the 
conditions of the modern subject through the history of the 'subjectus' becoming 
'citizen', from absolute monarchy to 'The Declaration of the Rights of Man' in 1789. 











Thus, the modern subject exists in a tautologicaVcircular relationship to its 
citizenship/ness: 'The citizen is the subject, the citizen is always a supposed subject 
(legal subject, psychological subject, transcendental subject)' (Balibar, 1991: 45), and 
so. 'this figure exceeds its own institution', existing in the antinomy of the 'formal' 
and 'real'- both legally 'subject' as in 'subject-us'/ed and universally 'subjectum', 
prior to and above the law it potentially legislates (Balibar, 1991: 46). In other words 
the opposition of freedoms as legislated and transcendental is reactivated, but now 
within the citizen subject. Balibar traces the complexities of what he calls the 
'hyperbolic proposition' (Balibar, 1991: 46) of the citizen 'becoming a subject' 
(Balibar, 1991: 45). It will be shown how the tension of freedoms is manifested here 
in a similar way to the way we have read '''Vbat is Enlightenment?' internally to the 
citizen-subj ect. 
Balibar quotes Rousseau at length to show the relationship between the citizen and the 
subject. In the words of Rouse au, it consists of 'each individual, contracting, so to 
speak with himself: '[MJan' as 'subjectum' of the political body, as that forming the 
general will, i.e. as citizen contracts with himself as holder of his own particular will, 
that is as subj ect (to the laws by which he is 'forced to be free', or forced to 
harmonize his particular will with the general (Balibar, 1991: 48). As a result no 
citizen subject is 'neither only above, nor only under the law, but at exactly the same 
level as it' or 'there must be an exact correspondence between the absolute activity of 
the citizen (legislation) and his absolute passivity (obedience to the law). But it is 
essential that this activity and this passivity be exactly correlative' (Balibar, 1991: 
49). Here there is a clear link to the interdependence or co-conditionality of the public 
and private uses of reason, or between freedom and obedience, reiterated here as a 
type of internal 'contract', just as in Kant's schema in 'What is Enlightenment'. 
Balibar's 'citizen subject' exists in exactly that tension between 'freedom' as 
transcendental and freedom as legislated, except that now 'transcendental' does not 
refer to some position before the law. The 'transcendence' of the subject, or of its 
freedom, refers only to the doubling of the human being, from the 'subjectus' that 
(s)he always was and still is, to her existence within the body politic, as everyone and 
no-one, as that moment of the formation of will as the general will- her ephemeral 











legislates. This would accord with our reading of the Kantian 'contract' with power 
which shows itself to remove power completely from the exchange so that the 
exchange of 'public' for 'private', or of public freedom for private obedience can be 
reduced instead to the 'split' between, i.e. within, the subject/citizen that Rousseau 
describes as 'contracting with himself. 
It seems that thus far you, our reader, have been somewhat mislead or at least we, that 
is you and I in our reading, have mislead ourselves. An opposition or tension between 
freedom as legislated and freedom as idea presented itself throughout our reading as 
the irreconcilable poles that framed our discussion of Kant as well as his political 
philosophy. However, our tracing of this subtextual antinomy that at first appeared to 
be polemical has in fact proved itself to be dialectical27 • Freedom as idea and 
legislated freedoms become the two moments of 'freedom' or in the form of citizen 
and subject, the two moments of the 'citizen subject'. So too in Kant's 'contract' 
private obedience is the condition for, and only possible on the condition of public 
freedom; these are the dialectical moments of the double life of the 'citizen subject', 
who is now historicised in a slightly different way as process, as the act of constantly 
negating the 'subject' /subjectus in the process of 'becoming a subject', that is 
'sovereign subject'. 
Two Solutions: Constituting Freedoms or Contesting Freedom? 
Comparison of the translated version and the original indicate two possible solutions 
to the problem of the place of morality in the political sphere, which we have argued 
constitutes the tension between theory and practise, or philosophy and power in 
general. The one reading suggests that publicness/publicity articulates the relationship 
between the two poles. In this case the translation is instructive, for now 
pUblic/private becomes civil/civic, or state/civil society and the problem of modem 
politics is to articulate the relationship between the two, whether it is to the limiting of 
state power against private, mostly economic rights at the basis of liberalism, the 
emphasis of the role of the state in ensuring civil liberties in Republicanism, or the 
emphasis on the mediatory role of the public sphere or of social movements in the 











Habennas offers one of the strongest critiques of civil society in the Structural 
Trans/ormation 0/ the Public Sphere and offers an historical, nonnative solution via 
publicness. Hannah Arendt's critique of the Modern dualism of state/civil society 
focuses on the erosion of the public/private distinction essential for political action by 
the politicisation of what she calls the social question29• Balibar ends his schematic, 
but conceptually rich, paper by mapping his citizen subject to Foucault's empirico-
transcendental doublet. Foucault offers one of the darkest accounts of civil society. 
However, his way of looking at society in stark contrast to these others is not directly 
political. 
At issue here are two ways of articulating the relationship between critique and 
power, or between philosophical theory and political practise. The one articulates 
itself in the schism between state and civil society, assuming this to the cleavage in 
Modern existence that needs to be addressed most urgently. Arendt and Habennas, in 
different ways, emphasise the role of public communication, balanced with private 
rights and believe in the philosopher's mediating role between state and civil society. 
This is a role similar to the one Kant outlines in CF: addressing the grievances of the 
people to the ruler, or the lawmakers. Foucault's disciplinary power is, however, 
much closer to an internalised condition of power, intimately tied to ones' knowledge 
of oneself. Foucault does not believe in a social contract exactly, rather like Balibar 
the contract is immanent, between citizen and subject, not citizen and state, and thus I 
would argue that its condition is the existence of that strange double: the citizen-
subject. Our next section will outline the irreconcilability of the Habennas' and 
Arendt's juridico-political versus Foucault's disciplinary model of power. Foucault 
and Habennas could not meet, and Habennas is very critical of Foucault's failure to 
articulate a political position between society and state. However, before he died 
Foucault had attempted arrange a conference with Habennas. The topic of the 
conference was to be Kant's 'What is Enlightenment?'. The conference would never 
take place. 3o 
The third section of my argument will begin with a brief outline of the irreconcilable 
political positions of Habennas and Foucault, as well as Arendt. This will be followed 
by a closer reading of Foucault's discussion of Kant's WE, a paper and a question that 











the Habennassianl Arendtian resolution of the political-moral problem as well as the 
Foucauldian non-contractual model of power. Perhaps the fact hat both readings are 
possible accounts for Foucault's suggestion of WE as a topic for a debate with 
Habennas. My aim is not to resolve these oppositions but in fact to trace the 
conditions of the Foucauldian model of power-knowledge: the intimate connection of 
'citizen-subject' and the French Revolution, as pointed out by Balibar. We will show 
that not only is this is the condition for Foucault's genealogical critique, but also for 
the type of 'radical' critique of the present in the dialectical-historical method of A-H, 
and in Kant's radical 31 'judgement' of revolution. It is thus that Foucault's connection 
between revolution, enlightenment, and critique becomes revealing when we trace it 
to Hannah Arendt's reading of Kant's unwritten political philosophy from his 
Critique of Aesthetic Judgement. A close reading of Kant's Critique of Aesthetic 
Judgement, so to speak, pits Arendt and indirectly Habennas against Foucault and 
(again indirectly) Adorno and Horkheimer. It is not my aim to reconcile the divergent 
critical positions but to show that the radical critiques of Foucault and A-H are caught 
up in a particularly aesthetic relationship between power, philosophy, history, and 
revolution. An examination of Arendt's linking of his aesthetic and political 
philosophy via Kant's 'judgement' of the French Revolution in CF, will show this to 
be the very same aesthetic fonnulation as Kant's radical statement about the French 
Revolution 
I The Trancendemal Subject is 'a non-empirical '"I"' which constitutes nature from disconnected 
impressions but which itself is never to be met with in experience' (Forster, 1989: 8). 
2 Eckart Forster argues that Kant reduces the possibility of metaphysics to one 'Hauptfrage .. . are 
s)llthetic (/ priori judgements possible?' (Forster, 1989: 4). 
j Koselleck's Kritik und Krise was not available in English, so I have had to rely on Cohen and Arata's 











4 As subject, 'each member ... has rights of coercion in relation to all others, except in relation to the 
head of state. For he alone is not a member of the commonwealth' (Kant, TP: 75). Kant then goes to 
qualify the category of the citizen as 'adult male, as 'his own master' (thus not of feudal peasant 
classes) and as having 'some property (which can include any skill, trade, fine art or science) to support 
himself' (Kant, TP: 78). 
5 Kant resolves this by basing his political ideas on the negativity of the moral law, which undermines 
any dIstinction between moral theory and political practise. Due to the 'moral feeling': 'if we violate 
it, even without considering the disadvantages which might result, we feel the consequences directly'. 
(Kant, TP: 72, italics mine). In other words theorising the moral law is always already practice. 
6 The historical background to this conflict may be the increasing autonomy of the bureaucracy and the 
complementary institutionalisation of the 'science of political management' or 'Cameralism' ",ithin the 
universities. (Sheehan, 1989: 70; 193-196) 
7 There is evidence that Kant faced a very real threat of censorship, 'Kant was unfailingly positive 
about the revolution in private conversations, but since his run-in with royal censors in 1787 he was 
even more discreet than usual in his public pronouncements.' (Sheehan, 1989: 211) 
g This refers to the 'historical position of eighteenth-century intellectuals' who saw their role as 
Bildung: the 'moral' and cultural education of the 'unenlightened masses'. (Sheehan, 1989: 204) 
9 Publicity here may refer also to the emergence of a literary public sphere, which became a medium of 
political confrontation, where political affairs were open to the criticism of 'public opinion'. 
(Habermas, 1989: chapter 2) 
10 Historically the relationship of the critical intellectual and the state was often uneasy, however most 
saw the state's authority as 'the best hope for refonn', and often 'a dependent relationship ... with 
established authority' often made criticism of that authority difficult. (Sheehan, 1989: 203) 
11 There is a tension here between the role of 18 th Century Gennan intellectuals as exclusive 
'representatives' and educators of the 'unenlightened' Volk with regard to the newly public political 
discourse and the sense of popular enlightenment, based on a public sphere that was already 
'necessarily open and universally accessible.' (Sheehan, 189: 204; 190) 
12 For Habermas the political public sphere evolves from cultural, literary public or 'world of letters', 
consisting of a proliferation of periodicals and newspapers. (Habennas, 1989: 38-43), Chartier notes 
Kant's emphasis on the 'written word' as forming a 'republic ofletters' (Chartier, 1991: 26). That this 
may have been restricted to the 'educated' Bourgeois, excluding the 'masses', is taken up by 
Habermas. 
13 Kant in fact faced a very real threat of censorship: In 1793 'Frederick ... himself severely 
reprimanded Kant for his Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft' (Gay, 1969: 71). This 
could also be directed against an increasingly autonomous bureaucratisation of the state, whose 
administrative organisation as independent from Frederick's command was manifested as a 'tension 
between ... theory and practice' (Sheehan, 1989: 70) 
14 'Frederick's conception of the state was shaped by enlightened ideas ... [S]tripped of its ceremonial, 
religious, and dynastic functions, the Frederician state emerges as the instrument of its own power' 
(Sheehan, 1989: 76) 
15 Habennas notes a 'certain continuity' ofthe·pubIicity of the emerging bourgeois public sphere and 
the public display of power at the prince's court. (Habermas, 1989: 29) 
16 This would reflect Kant's three-fold division into 'citizen', 'subject' and 'human being'. 
17 Historically, Frederician law 'sought to create a new kind of man, a citizen ... called 
StaatsbUrger'(Sheehan, 1989: 71). It is difficult to determine whether Kant differentiated his 











IS For Hobbes the state, not society, is the product of the social contract (Cohen & Arato, 1992: 88), 
while Locke's usage the category of civil society is neither causally independent nor referentially 
distinguishable from the state, it is merely the 'state liked' (DUIlll, 2001: 39-42), similarly for Adam 
Smith and other Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, civil society consists of polite (civilized), commercial 
society, which was not a political community (Oz-Salzberger: 58-9). 
19 Adam Seligman contrasts 'civic virtue' with 'civil society', or civil liberty. The former is a model of 
community based on citizenship, and on morality as inseparable from public life. In the latter, the 
'moral basis for society becomes more and more a private ideal' (Seligman, 1995: 204). 
20 Cohen and Arato explain that 'the Enlightenment notion of "society" (as contrasted with the state) ... 
[P]aradoxically ... often coexisted with the more traditional identification of civil and political society 
with the state' (Cohen & Arato, 1992: 89). 
21 Kant puts 'forward the notion of a citizen society, staatsbiirgerlicher Gesellschaft ... interpreted in 
the spirit of the French declaration of 1789', which rejected any compromise with the estate powers of 
the absolutist era, and makes the individual citizen or Biirger the bearer of rights (Cohen & Arato, 
1992: 90-92) 
22 This is the outcome of the Marxist criticism of Hegel's identification ofbiirgerlich with bourgeois in 
his term 'biirgerliche Gesellschaft', thus Hegel 'participates in a fundamental shift in the concept of 
civil society away from the original meaning of citizen society' (Cohen & Arato, 1992: 97). 
23 The translation occurs in a collection entitled What is Enlightenment? /8'" Century Answers and 2(jh 
Century Questions. the translator, James Schmidt, is also the editor ofthis collection, which 
considering his projection might be better titled 2(j" Century Answers to /8'" Century Questions. 
24 For Habermas, Kant's moral-politics is written when the Public Sphere already has 'the political 
function of articulating state with society' (Habennas, 1992: 104). 
25 Balibar, shows that what is essential for Descartes is the relational and hierarchical concept, 
'substance'. (Balibar, 1991: 36). 
26 Cartesian 'substance' is a relationship bet\veen opposites, 'both hierarchical and causal'. For 
Descartes 'freedom can ... only be thought of as the freedom ... of the subjected being ... a 
contradiction in terms' (Balibar, 1991: 36). 
27 I use the term dialectical in the same sense as A-H, as a two-way relationship, where both terms or 
moments co-determine one another, but must also negate the other in order to exist. Note this is not the 
totally destructive sense identified in the methodological problem of a break identified in A-H's 
dialectical philosophy of history, as discussed in chapter I. 
28 In 'Civil Society History and Possibilities' the historical essays share a single theme: to 'uncover' 
those hidden or repressed texts of the history of 'civil society' which share a normative ideal of the 
possibility oflegitimate political (public) authority to mediate between state and society. 
29 The 'politicisation', making 'public' oflabour and work in the 'social question' results in actual 
depoliticisation due to the inability to separate actual political, public issues from the material needs of 
'mass society'. (Cohen & Arato, 1991: 188-9). 
30 Foucault's 'untimely death' had pre-empted the planned debate between Foucault and Habermas, 
initially unable to agree on a topic for the conference, Habermas being surprised at Foucault's 
sugg~stion of Kant's 'What is Enlightenment?' (Kelly, 1994: 2-3). 
31 The use of the word 'radical' to describe both the thought of A-H and Kant on revolution, is in the 
sense of critiqu~ directed at the 'roots' of its object, whether they be historical, material or 
philosophical, and 'radical' in the sense of challenging authority, if indirectly via Kant's subtle 











Section 3: The Revolutionary Aesthetics of Radical Critique 
1. Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present 
A dissertation of this length can only offer a schematic comparison of the 
Habermassian and Arendtian critiques of the dualism state/civil society against that of 
Foucault. Most of this comparison takes as its background Cohen and Arato's Civil 
Society and Political Theory and the reader Critique and Power: recasting the 
F oucaultlHabermas Debatei. 
Disciplinary Versus Juridico-Political Power 
Foucault takes up the problem of power in Modernity as being inextricable from 
knowledge. He differentiates between 'juridico-political power' and something he 
calls' disciplinary power'. The latter consists of an internalisation of discourses of 
'power-knowledge', particularly those of the modern social sciences, that discipline 
the individual so that he or she subjects himself to power that is no longer locatable in 
a sovereign ruler, a state or even a single class, but that is 'pervasive' .(Cohen & 
Arato, 1992: 255-6). While he does not dismiss the state, Foucault rejects the 
'contractarian illusion that power can be made visible, localised, and restricted to the 
political state'; for Foucault this is an anachronistic 'form' or representation of power 
whose actual content consists of technique versus right, normalisation versus law and 
control versus punishment. (Cohen & Arato, 1992: 260-1). For Foucault, like A-H, all 
power is 'domination'. 
In 'Two Lectures', Foucault demonstrates the incommensurability of the juridico-
political and the disciplinary models of power. These two models of power are 'so 
heterogeneous that they cannot possibly be reduced to each other' (Foucault, 1994: 
43), thus addressing disciplinary power through recourse to rights based on the 
juridico-political model is a 'blind alley' (Foucault, 1994: 45). Following from this 
Foucault's genealogical method is 'an ascending analysis of power, starting from 
.. .its infinitesimal mechanisms, which each have their own history, ... trajectory 











has power (Foucault, 1994: 35) unanswerable, rather the 'truth of power' lies in the 
production of truth itself, i.e. in knowledge or 'true discourses which are the bearers 
of the specific effects of power' (Foucault, 1994: 32). 
Foucault's Non-Political Account of Power 
It is precisely because the genealogical method avoids any articulation of the 
disciplinary with the juridico-political power that Foucault fails to articulate an 
explicit political position. For Habermas, Foucault is caught up in the 'self-
referentiality' of his genealogical critique, for by basing all forms of k..'1owledge on 
SUbjugation he eliminates any meaning, validity, value or normativity for his own 
critique: '[gJenealogical historiography deals with an object domain from which the 
theory of power has erased all traces of communicative actions entangled in lifeworld 
contexts' (Habermas, 1994: 98). Unlike Foucault Habermas and Arendt provide for a 
normative and a critical political philosophy. Cohen and Arato point out that while 
Foucault's 'dark' account of (civil) society 'presupposes differentiation ... between 
state and society', he makes the 'error' of discounting any claims of a Bourgeois 
public sphere or civil 30ciety and pUblicity to deal with the emergent 'power' of 
Modernity (Cohen & Arato, 1992: 281). Habermas' historicist, normative critique of 
civil society is a history of the decline of the public sphere, so as to recapture a richer 
set of mediations between civil society and state. ii Hannah Arendt criticises what she 
calls the 'rise of the social' or of society as resulting in the dissolution the separate 
spheres of public/private, which is the condition for the classical RomanJGreek 
Republican political models on which she bases her 'redemptive criticism' (Cohen 
and Arato: 178),ill 
Habennas' 'theory of communicative action' provides for the possibility of a 
nonnative critique of power, which sees values, norms and truth as generated by 
social actors or social groups in relation to the very life-world contexts that they also 
generate, an 'action-versus systems-theoretic' account. Honneth compares the 
Adorno's 'sociological deficit' to Foucault's focus on systems instead of the actors 
who produce those systems. (Honneth, 1994 : 178-81) While Habennas and Foucault 
both reject the autonomous, rational subject of the Enlightenment, Habennas does aim 











individual identity' (McCarthy, 1994: 248-9). Habennas does not abandon a 
nornlative framework oflegitimate juridico-political rights, located within a 'public 
sphere' or some deliberative, communicative framework. Similarly Arendt's critique 
of civil society aims at a re-differentiation of state/civil society in tenns of 
public/private modelled on the GreekIRoman polis. Both critiques are premised on a 
differentiation or re-differentiation of state/civil society, and thus centre on 
legitimating discourses of juridico-political power. While Foucault sees both 
disciplinary and juridico-political power as 'two absolutely integral constituents of the 
general mechanisms of power in our society' (Foucault, 1994: 45), he never attempts 
to articulate the one in terms of the other. This refusal to reconcile these two 
contradictory models of power means that like the Frankfurt school he literally 
'disempowers critique ... by an analysis that equates discourse, reflection and truth 
with power strategies.' (Cohen & Arato, 1992: 292) Like the dialectical method his 
genealogy is caught up in the very negativity of the reason it wants to expose as 
domination, but from which it can offer no way out. 
The Heart of the Present 
In an article on Foucault's reading on Kant's WE, following Foucault's 'sudden 
death' (Habennas,1994: 149), Habennas admits his surprise at Foucault's 
reconciliation of his own thought with this Enlightenment thinker, of whom Foucault 
is so critical in his Order o/Things: 'How can Foucault's self-understanding as a 
thinker in the tradition of the Enlightenment be compatible with his unmistakable 
critique of precisely this fonn of knowledge, which is that of modernity?' (Habennas, 
1994: 152) Other critics have also noted this contradiction. For many it marks a re-
'tum' in Foucault's thought back to what he had previously tried to dismantle: 'the 
subject and power' (McCarthy, 1994: 261-2). Is this a return to the possibilities of a 
contract with power, with an exchange between passivity and critical activity at its 
basis? Is Foucault returning to a contractual, juridical-political model of power by 
aligning himself with Kant's separation of public/private reason in this paper? 
Christopher Norris, defends Foucault from accusations of post-modem pragmatism 
and relativism by critics like Richard Rorty'V, and the 'liberal communitarian' critique 
Michael Walzer (Norris, 1993: 53f. They characterise this as a return to subjective 











1993: 73). Norris explains that' ... what emerges from Foucault's series of 
engagements with the legacy of Kantian thought is not so much an overcoming of old 
antinomies as a re-run of issues that have not been laid to rest' (Norris, 1993: 51-2). It 
is Foucault's re- 'turn' to Kant, so to speak, that we now turn. 
For Habermas, Foucault in finding in Kant 'the first philosopher to take aim like an 
archer at the heart of the present' (Habermas, 1994: 151), is drawn back into the very 
philosophical discourse of Modernity that is the target of his critique. It is this 
connection between philosophy, history and power, and their relationship to the 
present, or Modernity that we will take up. It will be shown that Foucault makes a link 
between enlightenment, revolution and critique; getting to grips with this will help us 
understand Foucault's return to 'Modernity'. Norris' reference to Foucault's 
'aestheticisation of ethics and politics' will prove to be instructive as we trace out an 
implicit link to Kant's aesthetics, so as to show the types of 'antinomies' Foucault 
inherits from Kant. As such we take aim at Foucault's answer to the question, which 
is also at the heart of the present discussion: 'What is Enlightenment?' 
2. RevolutionlEnlightenment/Critique 
Enlightenment 
In his 'What Is Enlightenment?', Michel Foucault historicises Kant's answer to the 
question by working out just that: Kant's unique relationship to his own present. In 
that Foucault reads 'What is Enlightenment?' as an 'entirely different' way of 
articulating the 'present, or ofphilosophy 'reflecting on its own present' (Foucault, 
1984: 33). What Foucault emphasises is that 'this little text is located in a sense at the 
crossroads of critical reflection and reflection on history .. .it seems to me that it is the 
first time that a philosopher has connected in this way, closely and from the inside, 
the significance of his work with respect to knowledge, a reflection on history and a 
particular analysis of the specific moment at which he is writing and because of what 
he is writing ... And, by looking at it in this way, it seems to me we may recognise a 
point of departure: the outline of what one might call the attitude of modernity' 
(Foucault, 1984: 38). Instead of defining Modernity as the epoch following 
'Enlightenment', or preceding post-modernity, Foucault defines 'modernity rather as 











For Foucault the attitude of modernity as the attempt to get to grips with our own 
historical determination, of the 'contemporary limits of the necessary', in order to 
both permanently critique and recreate ourselves in our autonomyvii. This is 
Foucault's genealogical and archeological project of determining the historical 
conditions, in the sense of determining materially within institutions of power or 
knowledge systems the ~discourses that articulate what we think, say, and do as so 
many historical events .. .it will separate out, from the contingency that has made us 
what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing or thinking what we are, do, or 
think.' (Foucault, 1984: 46). 
Foucau1t glosses the interdependence of public and private uses of reason that we 
have traced in detail. For him the question of 'how [is] a public use of ... reason to be 
assured?', merely formulates the 'Enlightenment ... as a political problem'(Foucault, 
1984: 37). For Foucault this 'political problem' is resolved by Kant when 
'he proposes to Frederick II, in scarcely veiled terms, a sort of contract - what might 
be called the contract of rational despotism with free reason: the public and free use of 
autonomous reason will be the best guarantee of obedience, on condition. however, 
that the political principle that must be obeyed itself be in conformity with universal 
reason' (Foucault, 1984: 37). We have discussed this, and we have also proposed the 
possibility of a slightly more risky or more radical reading. Kant's text by a possibly 
unconscious logic completely removes Frederick from the contract between public 
and private uses of reason so that it becomes a contract of the citizen-subject so to 
speak, with himself. 
However, Foucault is not interested in getting to grips with a text that 'is not always 
very clear despite its brevity' (Foucault, 1984: 34), he is more interested in its 
relationship to history, or to its own present. Foucault does not seem to see the 
possible link of this internalisation of the political principle to the disciplinary notion 
of power at the basis of his own genealogical project. Here I would propose that the 
reason Foucault proposed a debate with Habermas around Kant's answer to this 
question is that it contains within it two possible answers, or readings, which are 
.. 











contract between subject and sovereign or citizen and state, the second sees power as 
an internalisation of domination, or of the political principle that constitutes the 
citizen-subject as member of the social body to which it subordinates itself. This latter 
model of disciplinary power is outside ofa sort of 'economism' ofpower, where in 
the 'classic, juridical theory, power is taken to be a right which one is able to possess 
like a commodity', and thus able to 'transfer or alienate ... through a legal 
act. .. contract' (Foucault, 1994: 26).viii 
It is this conditional relationship between the emergence of 'citizen-subject' and 
Foucault's genealogical method that we will trace to a particularly aesthetic 
relationship between the radical critique of power and the modern philosophy of 
history that emerges after, or with, the French Revolution. In 'Kant on Enlightenment 
and Revolution', Foucault makes the link we began to make in section 2 between WE 
and CF, between Enlightenment and revolution. ix 
Revolution/Critique 
Foucault calls CF 'a kind of sequel to the text of 1784'(Foucault, 1986: 91). It asks a 
parallel question to 'What is Enlightenment?', that is 'What is Revolution?'. He 
highlights the similarities between Kant's discussion of revolution and his discussion 
of the' Enlightenment', each as a contemporary historical eventx• Furthermore 
Foucault makes the link between his project and Aufklarung, or the attitude of 
enlightenment as embodied in these texts: 'With these two texts we are in a sense at 
the place of origin, the point of departure of a whole dynasty of philosophical 
questions. These two questions, 'was ist Aufkliirung?, 'what is revolution?', are the 
two forms in which Kant posed the question of his oWn present. They are also, I 
believe two questions which have continued to haunt, ifnot all modern philosophy 
since the Nineteenth century, at least a great part of it' (Foucault, 19886: 95). It now 
becomes clear that Foucault wants to situate the Kantian interrogation of the present, 
which takes the form of historic ising or working out the historical conditions of his 
own philosophical discourse as the origin of a whole mode of philosophical thought, 
and he places his own project within that. 
The questions, 'What is Enlightenment?' and 'What is Revolution?' are connected to 











philosophers on the topic. Here Foucault defines critique as the possibility of 
questioning the relations between the subject, power and truth: 'critique is the 
movement through which the subject gives itself the right to question truth concerning 
its power effects and to question power about its discourses of truth. For Foucault 
Kant asks two questions. The first is from an idealist position: 'Do you really know 
how far you can know?', so that 'the courage of knowing ... consists in ... recognising 
the limits of knowledge' (Foucault, 1996: 387). In this first question, Kantian 
'critique' and' AufkHirung' are often treated as tautologicaL For Foucault, the 
slippage between 'free use of reason' and enlightenment is problematic because it 
fails to historicise the relationship between philosophical discourse and its present. It 
fails to ask Kant's other question, which is the question 'what is critique?' or 'what is 
enlightenment?'. Kant's philosophical reflection on his own knowledge as reflection 
on his present no longer merely equates enlightenment and critique. 
Foucault explains that the 'critical attitude' that is based on a 'suspicion that there is 
something in rationalisation and perhaps even in reason itself that is responsible for 
the excess of power. .. from the Hegelian left to the Frankfurt School there was a 
whole critique of positivism, of objectivism, of rationalisation, of techne and of 
technocization' (Foucault, 1996: 388) It is in this 'tradition' (which is not really a 
tradition) that Foucault places himself, begun as it is from these three 'questions' left 
in the background of Kant's work: 'the problem of Aufklarung, which is perhaps after 
all the problem of modem philosophy' (Foucault, 1996: 391). Foucault notes that his 
approach to this problem makes him 'brothers with the Frankfurt School'. (Foucault, 
1996: 391) 
The Conditions of Enlightenment/Critique/Revolution 
Foucault discusses Kant's WE on three separate occasions, in these discussions he 
points out the equivalence of Enlightenment, Critique and Revolution in posing the 
question of the relationship of knowledge to the present. He calls this the 'critical 
attitude' or 'the problem of modem philosophy', the understanding that knowledge 
cannot be separated from the present, or its contingent power. In some sense Foucault 
wants to detach this 'critical attitude' from the era known as the Enlightenment, that 
preceded Modernity, but in another he makes it 'the place of origin, the point of 











enables such self-consciousness. Foucault makes the link between enlightenment in 
the 'little text' on enlightenment and revolution in CF as philosophical reflections on 
the present. However, I would argue that he glosses over the conditions of such 
reflection on the present, for both enlightenment and revolution. 
Foucault glosses over the condition for Kant's judgement of the revolution: the 
significance or meaning of this historical event is not in the success or failure of the 
'revolutionary drama', for Kant the proper locus of the value and meaning of the 
revolution is the spectators, not the actors, '[W]hat matters in the revolution is not the 
Revolution itself, it is what takes place in the heads of the people who do not make it 
or in any case are not its principle actors' (Foucault, 1984: 94). Furthenuore, in the 
case of 'WE, the condition for judgement is the differentiation of public and private 
uses of reason, which we have shown is contingent on the emergence of that strangely 
doubled 'citizen subject', who we have argued is also the locus of Foucauldian 
disciplinary power. 
I would argue that the condition for reflection on the Enlightenment is the 
internalisation of the political principle, that is the doubling of 'citizen subject' into 
private and public selves as the immanent nature of the 'political contract' in 
Modernity. This enables the 'citizen subject' to be both a passive element of the 
process of Enlightenment, as weB as an active subject obliged to actively bring about 
man's' freedom'. There is space both for the non-reflective (private) and critical 
(public) uses of reason within this double existence. Now, in the case of the 
revolution, the condition for reflection on the revolution is that its meaning is 
removed from the actual actors and events of the revolution, and placed with the 
spectators, who cannot act despite their own public sympathy. Isn't this just another 
kind of doubling of the self, into spectator and actor, if forbidden to act? Spectatorship 
is the condition for reflection on the revolution, and being 'citizen subject' is the 
condition for reflection on the Enlightenment, both of which are fonus of reflection 
on the present, i.e. fonus of radical critique. Here I mean radical in both senses, of 
returning to the 'root'; and as in challenging existing power structures, which provide 
for the more subversive readings of Kant's 'challenge' to Frederick and his approval 
of the French Revolution. What exactly is the fonu of this conditional relationship 











enlightenment/critique/revolution or the present? Surely this constellation is the 
reason that Foucault kept returning to this 'little text', so obscure 'despite its brevity' 
(Foucault, 1984: 34). 
To work out this relationship we will turn to Hannah Arendt's Lectures on Kant's 
Political Philosophy. What we will argue is that there is, a particularly 'aesthetic' 
relationship between the enlightenment, critique and the revolution that is so to speak 
inherently political, informing and informed by the emergence of the 'citizen subject' 
as spectator within a Modern philosophy of history based on 'revolution'. 
Furthermore, it will be shown that a particular form of critique, that is Foucault's 
genealogical method and A-H's dialectic, are caught up in this aesthetic relationship 
to the present. The lack of explicit political position within these modes of 'radical' 
critique in contrast to Habermas and Arendt will be shown to be inextricable from this 
aesthetic formulation. To show how revolution acts as a metahistorical concept in the 
modern philosophy of history we will use Reinhart Koselleck's 'The Semantics of 
Historical Time', where in three essays he discusses the relationship of the philosophy 
of history as progress and the French revolution. Arendt shows that the actual location 
of Kant's unwritten political philosophy is his Critique of Aesthetic Judgement. 
Arendt's link between Kant's political thought and 'taste' is Revolution. 
3. The Aestbetic Formulation of the Kantian political-moral problem 
Hannah Arendt's 'Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy' begin with an antinomy 
for, explains Arendt, Kant 'never wrote a political philosophy' (Arendt, 1982: 7). My 
reading of the Conflict of the Faculties was influenced by Arendt's, which made clear 
to me Kant's focus on the spectators versus the actors of the revolution, and which 
clearly illustrates the role of publicness in Kant's resolution of the moral-political 
problem, if only to show me its complications. Similarly, the link that she makes from 
this to aesthetic judgement also proves to be both revealing and complicated. Of 
course, the way that Kant judges the revolution according to his philosophy of history 
is not compatible with his moral philosophy, which as has been shown condemns all 











Revolutionary Actors and Spectators 
Arendt discusses this as 'the clash between the principle according to which you 
should act and the principle according to which you judge' (Arendt, 1982: 48). This is 
shown to be the' conflict between the engaged actor and the judging spectator', or "a 
conflict of politics with morality"(Arendt, 1982: 48). I have traced this problem of a 
moral-politics in detail, only to arrive at two possible solutions, the one being 
'publicness', as what mediates between civil society and sovereign state. The other 
solution is articulated in an internalised contract between what we have called the 
'citizen subject' whose emergence is concomitant with the French revolution. 
Arendt's link between the political and the aesthetic via Kant's judgement of the 
French Revolution will prove instructive on the link between this internalised political 
principle and a philosophy of history that is itselfbased on revolution. 
Kant's discussions of the French Revolution give a privileged status to the spectator: 
'he could discover a meaning in the course taken by events .... that the actors ignored; 
and the existential ground for his insights was his disinterestedness, his non-
involvement' (Arendt, 1982: 54). For Arendt this 'supremacy' of the spectator is 
'among the oldest, most decisive, notions of philosophy ... the superiority of the 
contemplative way of life' (Arendt, 1982: 55). However, for Arendt 'Kant's view is 
different' (Arendt, 1982: 55). Kant makes the spectator the 'judge', and so '[T]here is 
joined to this old notion in Kant an altogether new one, the notion of progress, which 
actually provides the standard according to which one judges.'(Arendt, 1982: 56) She 
compares this to the Greek spectator for whom the meaning of the tragedy or a 
particular event is in its 'end': 
[PJrogress as the standard by which to judge history somehow reverses the old principle that 
the meaning ofa story reveals itself only at its end ... [IJn Kant, the story's or event's 
importance lies precisely not at its end but in its opening up new horizons for the future. ]t is 
the hope it contained for future generations that made the French Revolution such an 
important event., ,[I]t is a "world-historical" event because it contains the seeds of the future. 
(Arendt, 1982: 56), 











1982: 57) In this 'Perpetual Progress' towards peace, or the realisation of freedom the 
subject is 'the human race in general'; for Arendt this is the position occupied by the 
spectator as "world citizen" or "world spectator" (Arendt, 1982: 58), who judges 
'behind the backs of the actors' (Arendt, 1982: 59). 
Arendt identifies that this type of judgement is very different from the practical 
judgement that occurs in moral matters, which relates the will to some object, and 
thus always involve an action, an act which accords theory with practise because it 
can only happen according to the maxim of reason. Most of Kant's political 
philosophical writings exist in this tension, in what we have called the conflict of 
theory with practise, or freedom as idea versus as legislated. She shows that Kant's 
treatment of the French Revolution is an exception, because the event itself is 
exceptional: 'what constituted the appropriate public realm for this particular event 
were not the actors but the acclaiming spectators' (Arendt, 1982: 61). It is thus that 
she turns to the aesthetics, where she finds an 'analagous problem ': genius versus 
taste. (Arendt, 1982: 61) 
The End of Progress 
From now onwards the direction in which Hannah Arendt's reading leads is 
determined by her final point, the end, so to speak, of her argument: 'sociability' is 
the 'very origin, not the goal, of man's humanity' (Arendt, 1982: 74). This allows her 
to alter Kant's philosophy of history, to redirect it from the end of progress to the 
origins of 'sociability', or 'society'. She emphasises something Kant calls 'sensus 
communis' or common sense, as 'a faculty of judgement which in its reflection, takes 
account (apriori) of the mode of representation of all other men ... in order, as it were, 
to compare its judgement with the collective reason of humanity' (Arendt, 1982: 71), 
quote from Kant. She connects this common sense to the idea of taste as 'the faculty 
of judging apriori of the communicability of feelings that are bound up with a given 
representation' (Arendt, 1982: 72, Kant). Now, this is not an incorrect reading of 
Kant, and the 'sensus communis' is essential to his deduction, but I will show that 
what he means by the airport 'communicability of feelings' is far from an actual 












What Arendt does however is to connect common sense to something Kant calls the 
'Empirical Interest in the Beautiful', which since Kant's deduction is concerned with 
'pure' judgements of taste for Kant it an aside and thus; 'of no importance for us here' 
(CJ, §29: 156). It is however, important for Arendt's reading: 
[T]he empirical interest in the beautiful exists only in society ... [F]urther, a regard to universal 
communicability is a thing which everyone expects and requires from everyone else, just as if 
it were an original compact dictated by humanity itself. 
(Arendt, 1982 quoting CJ: 155) 
Now, a judgement of beauty must necessarily occur outside of any interest in the 
object, that is no desire, no sensation, and no concept of that object. It is a judgement 
apriori, it involves no actual communication with others, but an ability to judge of 
something called 'universal communicability', an idea I would argue Kant leaves 
somewhat undefined or ambiguous. My discussion of the ambiguities of Kant's 
deduction will follow. What is important for now is that this 'empirical' and thus 
'aposteriori' interest in the beautiful occurs after the fact, that is 'after it has once been 
posited as a pure aesthetic judgement', this interest in society combines with it. (.154) 
The 'as if in the above statement is telling. For Arendt this 'as if becomes 'the 
maxim of the actor and the maxim, the "standard", according to which the spectator 
judges the spectacle of the world', i.e. 'this original compact' is what unites 'actor and 
spectator' (Arendt, 1982: 75), 'world spectator' is now also 'world citizen' who must 
judge and act 'as if universal communicability were an original compact of society 
(Arendt, 1982: 76). However, the tautology in this is clear. The 'universal 
communicability' does not exactly presuppose society - but acts as ifit did. Rather, 
this empirical interest in society attaches itself to the aesthetic judgement after the 
fact, i.e. not apriori. Nonetheless, Arendt is correct in assuming that 'universal 
communicability' is the pre-requisite for judgements of taste. However, this far from 
simply presupposes' empirical society'. Rather these difficulties or what Kant would 
call 'antinomies' in this idea of 'universal communicability' are exactly what informs 
the difficulties in Kant's deduction of aesthetic judgement. 
I "'iil! show how Kant's deduction of pure judgements of taste is made possible by the 











reading, because of its redirection of Kant's philosophy of history from progress to 
'sociability', that is to origins instead of ends, continually conflates 'universal 
communicability' with actual communication that is dependent on the empirical 
existence of society. 
A Transcendental Sleight of Hand 
Arendt's connection to 'a similar or analogous situation, the relation between the 
artist, the maker, or the genius and his audience' as analogous to the relationship of 
spectator/actor (Arendt, 1982: 65), makes for her connection to the problem of taste in 
general: how does this most private of senses come to be used to describe the most 
public of faculties? Essentially this is the same question that CJ attempts to answer, 
'How are judgements of taste possible', that is how is it possible that subjective 
judgements are asserted as if they were objective, as if the statement that something is 
beautiful will be agreed to by everyone. That aesthetic judgement is referred to as 
'taste', that most private and immediate of senses whose 'it-pleases-or-displeases me 
is overwhelmingly present', yet carmot be 'represented', is symptomatic of the very 
problem with Kant's deduction of such objective-subjective judgements, such 
privately-public statements as, 'this is beautiful'. (Arendt, 1982: 66) 
The problem of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement is this: 
[I]n all judgements by which we describe anything as beautiful we tolerate no one else being 
of a different opinion. and in taking up this position we do not rest our judgement upon 
concepts, but only on our feeling. Accordingly we introduce this fundamental feeling not as a 
private feeling, but as a public sense .... [T]he assertion is not that every one will fall in with 
our judgement but rather that everyone ought to agree with it. Here I put forward my 
judgement of taste as an example of the judgement of common sense, and attribute to it on 
that account e'(emp/ary validity. (CJ, § 22: 84) 
In other words Kant attempts to deduce the possibility of how something 'subjectively 
universal (a necessary idea for every one), could, in what concerns the consensus of 










asks, how is a subjective judgement to be 'converted into a rule for everyone' (eJ, 
§22: 84-5)? 
We will argue that Arendt's argument is premised on the successful deduction of the 
'subjectively universal': she assumes that Kant manages the transcendental deduction 
of aesthetic judgements. We will argue, however, that Kant's deduction of 
judgements of taste proves to be a transcendental sleight of hand. Kant explains, 
[W]hat makes this deduction so easy is that it is spared the necessity of having to justify the objective 
reality of a concept. For beauty is not a concept of the Object, and the judgement of taste is not a 
cognitive judgement. (CJ, §38, Remark: 147) 
His entire deduction of the jUdgements of taste as synthetic apriort judgements (like 
the moral law) is based exactly on the 'formal' versus content-based nature of these 
non-cognitions. He progressively empties the phrase 'judgements of taste' of any 
empirical content (actual characteristics of the beautiful object) so that it entirely 
depends on a feeling (of pleasure, or displeasure in the case of the sublime) in the 
subject. Now, this feeling is not based on a sensation, a delight in the object itself, like 
a smell or the taste ofa meal, it is 'disinterested delight' (49)xii. It is, however, 
universal because of something Kant calls universal communicability. 
This is the precondition for judgements of beauty, their universal communicability: 
it is the universal capacity for being communicated incideIlt to the mental state in the given 
representation which, as the subjective condition of the judgement of taste, must be 
fundamental, with the pleasure in the object as its consequent. (CJ, § 9: 57, italics mine) 
This in tum causes the subject to assert his subjective response as universal, not 
exactly objective in the way that cognitive judgements subsume the empirical 
manifold of intuition under a concept but in an analogous way to the moral' ought', in 
that everyone 'ought' to agree on the beauty of the object. Having made this 
'universal communicability' prior to (as in the condition of) the judgement of taste, 
Kant is able to derive the transcendental status of such synthetic judgements, i.e. that 
they are apriori, that is not aposteriori or after the (empirical) fact or experience of 











possibility of cognition in general: the accordance of the imagination with the 
understanding in all cognitions. However, with one slight difference: this is a 'free 
play' of the imagination with the understanding (CJ, §9: 58). 
However, it is my contention that Kant never sufficiently explains how such a free 
play is possible. How can the understanding work at a merely formal level, when it is 
exactly the faculty involved in the sUbsumption of the object under the concept? Kant 
says that taste' contains a principle of subsumption, not of intuitions under concepts, 
but of intuitions or presentations, i.e. of the imagination, under the faculty of 
concepts, i.e. the understanding, so far as the former in its freedom accords with the 
latter in its conformity to law' (CJ, §35: 143). So he bases the transcendentality of 
judgements of taste on the ability of all men to reason, since everyone is capable of 
this simple operation of pure reason, or cognition: the sUbsumption of intuitions 
formed by the imagination under concepts ofthe understanding, however this time the 
subsumption happens formally, with the understanding at the service of the 
imagination, and 'apart from a concept' (CJ, §9: 60). It is a 'free pia}' of the cognitive 
faculties', that is of imagination and the understanding (CJ, §9: 58). 
This 'free play' however, remains a mysterious thing, based on the assumption of the 
universal communicability that precedes a feeling of pleasure in the beautiful object, 
but that cannot be known outside this feeling. Several questions remain unanswered. 
If the faculty of understanding is involved how does one prevent it from subsuming 
the object under a concept? If so, can one really talk about 'free play' as being totally 
formal? Kant seems to solve this with the idea that will become so important for 
Arendt, common sense. Kant defines it: 'there must be a subjective principle, and one 
which determines what pleases or displeases, by means of feeling only and not 
through concepts, but yet with universal validity. Such a principle, however, could 
only be regarded as a common sense. This differs essentially from common 












Two-Stage Reflection on Revolution 
Arendt makes use of Kant's discussions of common sense in his 'Deduction of Pure 
Aesthetic Judgements' (eJ, §39-40). I would argue that his earlier references to it 
tend to point merely to cognitive ability, that is the ability to reason in general as the 
condition for a common sense. For Arendt the basis of common sense is society, or 
sociability. Kant says that 'we assume a common sense as the necessary condition of 
the universal communicability of our knowledge, which is presupposed in every logic 
and every principle of knowledge that is not one of scepticism' (eJ, §21: 84). 
Let us a look a bit more closely at how Arendt reads the deduction of judgements of 
taste as successfuL Arendt in fact inverts the order of the pleasure in the beautiful 
object and the 'universal communicability', making the latter a consequence of the 
former, where for Kant universal communicability 'must be fundamental, with the 
pleasure in the object as its consequent' (eJ, §9: 57, italics mine). Her reason for 
doing this is so that she can break up the judgement of taste into two stages of 
reflective judgement, involving first the imagination and second 'common sense', 
removing the faculty of 'understanding' somewhat from the picture so as to politicise 
or socialise the aesthetic. 
Arendt reads aesthetic judgement as a two-stage process, first of 'removing the 
object' from perception or sensation by the re-presentation of it by the imagination, 
'the faculty of making present what is absent' (Arendt, 1982: 66). Thus, 'the object is 
removed from one's outward senses, it now becomes an object for one's inner senses' 
(Arendt, 1982: 68), creating the 'proper distance ... or disinterestedness' necessary for 
the 'operation of reflection', that is the second stage, 'the actual activity of judging 
something' (Arendt, 1982: 68). Now, Arendt makes the move to the political, by-
passing the rather mysterious, somewhat messy notion of the 'free play' of the 











Arendt the 'representation' by the imagination is 'immediately present to one's inner 
sense, and this inner sense is discriminatory by definition: it says it-pleases or it-
displeases ... it chooses' (Arendt, 1982: 69). Then there is a second stage of reflective 
judgement on this initial choice: 'this choice is itself subject to still another choice: 
one can approve or disapprove of the very fact of pleasing' (Arendt, 1982: 69). For 
Arendt the criterion of this second judgement is 'communicability', and the faculty 
for detennining the communicability of a judgement is 'common sense'. Arendt 
emphasises one sense of Kantian 'common sense' as that which is necessary for 
'communication'. For her this ultimately refers to speech as the action 'that fits us 
into a community' (70) XIV 
No-one familiar with Arendt's political philosophy would fail to recognise in this her 
emphasis on public speech as the most important fonn of human actionxv• This 
prepares for her politicisation of the aesthetic, or her aestheticisation of the political. 
For Arendt aims to show that aesthetic judgements are based on the existence of 
'common sense', which presupposes communication and thus community or 
empirical society as its criterion for making choices. xvi For Arendt Kant's judgement 
of the French revolution is analogous to the aesthetic since the 'universal yet 
disinterested Sympathy' of the observers can be divided into two stages. First, the 
observers experience 'pleasure', that is in the fonn of 'disinterested delight', when 
they reflect on the aesthetic object of judgement, the revolution, from which they are 
already sufficiently removed. Next, this pleasure in the beautiful object, the 
revolution, is detennined to be 'universal'. Since for Arendt, the criterion of aesthetic 
judgements is sociability, it must also be the criterion for this second stage of 
reflective judgement on the revolution. For Arendt a philosophy of history based on 
sociability as its origin (and end) implies that there can be a judgement where 
morality and politics do not conflict. Kant's judgement of the revolution is for Arendt 
such a moral-political judgement. 
While Arendt's reading is by no means far from Kant, I ¥/ould argue that there are in 
fact unresolved tensions within Kant's deduction, specifically concerning the primacy 
of the role of common sense/sensus communis. These tensions necessarily complicate 












Firstly, it is difficult to discern two stages ofreflective judgement, where first the 
imagination re-presents an object of sense, and then by-passing altogether the 
understanding has the effect of pleasure (which still sounds like a sensation), so that 
another stage of judgement on the original judgement/pleasure takes place. Kant does 
talk about 'pleasure perceived ... to be combined in the mind with the mere estimate 
of an object' (CJ, §37: 146), and that this delight in the object 'is connected with the 
mere estimate of its fonn, then what we feel to be associated in the mind with the 
representation of the object is nothing else than its subjective finality for 
judgement. .. which we may presuppose in all men' (CJ, §37: 146). Here pleasure 
results from the 'subjective finality', the formal operation of imagination and 
understanding, that is 'free play' associated with the representation. Thus, its 
universal communicability is 'fundamental', and pleasure 'consequent'. Furthermore, 
this 
pleasure must of necessity depend for every one upon the same conditions, seeing that they 
are the subjective conditions of the possibility of cognition in general, and the proportion of 
these cognitive faculties [Understanding -l- imagination] which is requisite for taste is 
requisite also for ordinary sound understanding. (CJ, §39: 150) 
This is Kant's transcendental sleight of hand, for he never really explains how 
understanding can operate without concepts, or what 'proportion' of understanding 
mixed with imagination is the right recipe for purely formal 'free play'. However, no 
one can argue about their apriori co-operation in cognition in general, already proved 
in the deduction of transcendental apriori categories in the Critique of Pure Reason. 
For the purposes of our argument, Kant has played out his card trick by a sleight of 
the hand. 
It is our argument that while introducing two stages into aesthetic judgements does 
resolve those difficulties in the transcendental deduction like the role 'free play' and 
'universal communicability', it does so by presupposing a common sense, that for 
Arendt amounts to sociability, an ultimately the empirical categories of society and 
communication in the fornl of speech. Examining Kant's double sense of the term 
common sensei sensus communis and its role in judgements of taste will make clear 











Common Sensei Sensus Communis 
Following the transcendental deduction, Kant again discusses the sensus communis or 
'common sense'. We will show that Arendt sort of brackets out an ambiguity in 
Kant's double sense of 'common sense'lsensus communis. 
An earlier question proves instructive on how the sensus communislcommon sense 
fits into Kant's argument. Kant asks, 
'[B]ut does such a common sense in fact exist as a constitutive principle of the possibility of 
experience, or is it formed for us as a regulative principle by a still higher principle of reason, 
that for higher ends fIrst seems to beget in us a common sense? Is taste in other words a 
natural and original faculty, or is it only the idea of one that is artifIcial and to be acquired by 
us, so that a judgement of taste with all its demand for universal assent. is but a requirement of 
reason for generating such a consensus, and does the 'ought" i.e. the objective necessity of all 
with the particular feeling of each, only betoken the possibility of arriving at some sort of 
unanimity in these matters, and the judgement of taste only adduce an example of the 
application of this principle?' (CJ, §20: 85) 
For Arendt taste is natural and original, since common sense is a faculty that 
presupposes sociability, which is the conclusion of her argument. For Kant, or for our 
readir.g of Kant, the answer to the above question is not that simple. We can rephrase 
the question: do judgements of taste pre-suppose a common sense, that is a 'public 
sense' or consensus, or by their operation actually bring it into existence? If everyone 
can think, and does so in the same way, that is by subsuming particulars under 
u!1iversals, the concepts of the understanding which Kant has proved exist a-priori, 
why would any kind of common sense/sensus communis, as in 'enlarged 
understanding,' be necessary a priori in order to test something that is 'common 
human understanding'? 
It seems that Kant's deduction is caught between two senses of common sense. The 
one is the possibility of any 'common human understanding', that is the possibility of 
conceptual thought in general, which is sufficient proof that judgements of taste are 











sense/semus communis, as that ability to change places with the other, to extend one's 
thought to imagine how others would think. The latter sense of common sense follows 
the deduction (eJ, §39-40), and here Arendt picks up on Kant's use of political 
metaphors to describe it. He calls it 'public sense, i.e. a critical faculty which in its 
reflective act takes account (apriori) of the mode of representation of every one else' 
(eJ, §40: 152). Furthermore, it indicates an 'enlarged mind: if he detaches himself 
from the subjective personal conditions of his judgement. .. and reflects on his own 
judgement from a universal standpoint'(eJ, §40: 153), furthermore this is 'the maxim 
of unprejudiced thought' (el, §40: 152). It is in this democratic sense that Arendt 
places 'common sense' /sensus communis at the basis of moral-political judgements, 
which for her are analogous to aesthetic judgements. 
Our main point, here, is that Kant's deduction does not resolve the contradiction or 
'antinomy of taste', since he never resolves the tension between these two ideas of 
common sense. It is thus very difficult to show that his judgements of taste 
presuppose any common sense, and I would argue that common sense is a relational 
concept, that comes about in the act of judging, but sort of presupposes itself in order 
to make that judgement. There are no judgements of taste without common sense, but 
common sense only comes about in judgements of taste. In other words 'taste' is 
contradictory, tautological, circular, revolutionary. As such it is leading us back to the 
revolution, from which this section began. Before we can arrive at this initial point it 
is necessary to close our discussion of the unresolved contradictions within Kant's 
aesthetics. 
The Sublime and the Genius 
Two sections in Kant's el stand apart from the deduction of pure aesthetic 
judgements of taste, stand apart in that they do not exactly fit in with the rest of his 
argument: genius and the sublime. Kant places 'fine art', the work of genius, below 
the beauty of nature, since it is (usually) representational and thus risks requiring a 
determinate concept of what it is supposed to be. As for the sublime, while located 
within objects of Nature, or the relationship between the subject and certain objects of 
nature, Kant excludes the necessity of a transcendental deduction of aesthetic 











the sublime in nature was at the same time their deduction', thus confining his 
deduction of jUdgements oftaste to 'judgements upon the beauty of things of nature.' 
(Cl, §30: 134). I will show that the unresolved contradictions of the deduction of 
judgements of taste reside in these two sections, which do not fit into a transcendental 
deduction that limits taste to 'the beauty of things of nature', with which neither the 
sublime nor genius are directly concerned. 
Sublime Subjects, Beautiful Objects 
The sublime in nature is not beautiful, and it is experienced as 'negative pleasure, 
involving both an attraction and repulsion to the object (Cl, §23: 91). It consists of 
those objects of nature that are 'ill-adapted to our faculty of presentation ... an outrage 
on the imagination' (Cl, §23: 91). These are objects at which our understanding 
reaches its limit, to which it is inadequate. Kant gives examples: 'shapeless mountain 
masses towering one above the other ... with their pyramids of ice, or the dark, 
tempestuous ocean .... the earth's diameter, .... the cosmos' (Cl, §26: 104-5) . 
The reason that Kant precludes the necessity of a transcendental deduction for 
judgements on the sublime in nature is that '[S]ublimity ... does not reside in any of 
the things of nature, but only in our mind'(Cl, §28: 114) or rather in the subject, the 
spectator not the object or spectacle. What is sublime is the ability of the subject to 
attempt to overcome the limits of its know ledge, expressing reason's superiority over 
sensual experience: 
the feeling of the sublime in nature is respect for our own vocation, which we attribute to an 
Object of nature by a certain subreption (substitution of a respect for the Object in place of 
one for the idea of humanity in our 0\\111 self - the Subject); and this feeling renders, as it were 
intuitable the supremacy of our cognitive faculties on the rational side over the greatest faculty 
of sensibility. (CJ, §27: 106) 
This removal of sublimity from object to subject implies that it is based on the final 
relation of the cognitive faculties in the subject, which is already' apriori final', since 











transcendental deduction. This removal to the subject has implications for the moral 
nature of aesthetic judgements too. 
Paul Guyer explains that most of Kant's contemporaries gave a 'theological account 
of the moral significance of the sublime' (Guyer, 1993: 259), symbolising the 
greatness of the creator. The Kantian alternative, however, is that the 'sublime makes 
the pain of being moral aesthetically cognisable' (Guyer, 1993: 253). In his final 
section of the CJ, Kant returns to 'freedom', the middle term of any synthetic apriori 
proposition, and as such of any transcendental deduction. He concludes his discussion 
of aesthetic judgements by showing that they are analogous to moral judgements 
because both are based on the idea of' freedom'. Simply put, the autonomy of 
judgements of taste from sense demonstrates or comes closest to the subject's 
'experience of freedom'. That, 'the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good' (CJ, 
§59: 222-5) means that beauty and morality are formally analogous, as if they follow 
the same rule, that of autonomy or reason, but they are not the same thing, and in fact 
an equivalence of the two is for Kant' even a dangerous threat to morality' (Guyer, 
1993: 257). Now, Guyer demonstrates another tension in Kant's relationship between 
the moral and the aesthetic: for Kant the sublime is 'a better symbol of morality' 
(Guyer, 1993: 258) since it truly 
represents the power of our reason to override all natural determinism ... [I]t is precisely the 
contrast between autonomy and the realm of nature which is the real basis for Kant's startling 
departure from the standard view that its vast extent and power makes nature itself sublime, 
(Guyer, 1993: 261) 
In other words the sublime is a better symbol of morality because it symbolises 
'freedom', or at least the tension within the subject that exercises the 'freedom' of 
reason. 
In fact we will argue that the 'sublime' is reminiscent of the 'schizophrenia' or self-
doubling involved in being both actor and spectator, genius and judge, public and 











nature is not estimated in our aesthetic judgement as sublime so far as exciting fear, but rather 
because it challenges our power (one not of nature) to regard as small those things of which 
we are wont to be solicitous (worldly goods, health, and life), and hence to regard its might (to 
which in these matters we are no doubt subject) as exercising over us and our personality no 
such rude dominion that we should bow down before it, once the question becomes one of our 
asserting or forsaking them. (eJ, §28: 111) 
The condition then for the experience of the sublime is an experience that occurs in a 
state of schizophrenia, 'not pleasure but a sort of delightful horror' (CJ, §29, General 
Remark: 131), the condition is both an immediate and real' fear' as well as the 
fearlessness of 'regarding our estate as exalted above it' (CJ, §28: 114). It is this that 
Guyer describes as the 'pain of being moral'; that the sublime is experienced in a state 
of pleasure and 'horror' is symbolic of the moral law's simultaneous requirement of 
'freedom' in unfreedom. It is the implications of this 'schizophrenia' in the sublime 
subject, no longer the natural object, and its connections to the 'citizen-subject' of 
Kant's moral politics, that we will finally trace out in relation to Kant's discussion of 
revolution, vis-a-vis Arendt's aestheticisation of it. 
Genius/Taste? 
Kant's subordination of genius to taste, is for Arendt analogous to the importance of 
role of the spectator as judge of the French Revolution, instead of its actors. It is 
necessary to show that once again 'taste' and genius exist in a circular, or dialectical 
relationship to one another, making for another unresolved tension within the 
deduction, and thus in its link to the judgement of revolution. 
Kant explains that 
Genius properly consists in the happy relationship, which science cannot teach nor industry 
learn. enabling one to find out ideas for a given concept, and, besides to hit upon the 
expression for them the expression by means of which the subjective mental condirion 












What is communicated here are something Kant calls aesthetic ideas, and what is 
communicated is not the idea but the 'subjective mental condition induced by the 
ideas'. Aesthetic ideas are the expression, but only by association, of the ideas of 
reason that 'cannot be adequately represented'. These are ideas like 'hell, eternity, 
creation, &c Or. .. death, envy, ... a1so love, fame, and the like' (el, §49: 176.) The 
aesthetic idea' serves the above rational idea as a substitute for logical presentation' 
(el, §49: 177). This seems to work by the laws of association, much like metaphor in 
poetry. Genius is the faculty which employs the imagination and the understanding to 
take these inexpressible ideas of reason and to 'body (them) forth to sense' (el, §49: 
177). 
This seems simple: we finally know what Kant means by 'free play' of imagination 
and understanding. It now becomes possible to understand beauty as being a kind of 
relationship between form and content, which communicates aesthetic ideas 
universally because everyone has the 'common sense' to recognise them. However, 
this positive conception of 'free play', and the possibility of representing an idea of 
reason may introduce something empirical into jUdgement of the works of genius, 
empirical in the sense of the ideational content expressed in the form of the object, 
and the intention of the artist. This positive explanation of genius does not really fit 
the negativity of the transcendental deduction. This may account for Kant's hierarchy 
of natural over artistic beauty. xviii 
Kant seems to resolve this by the introduction of the category of 'taste' into the work 
of genius. To avoid the beauty of art being based on a concept, the beautiful in art 
must be that which gives itself a rule, unlike beauty in nature. Yet, to be beautiful art 
must have the appearance of nature, that is it 'must not have the appearance of being 
intentional', of following pre-given rules. Genius, is 'the innate mental aptitude 
... through which nature gives the rule to art' (el, §46:168). While the products of 
genius must never imitate, 'its products must at the same time be models' (el, §46: 
168). In other words fine art as the product of genius must always be exemplary, that 
is to serve as a rule or standard for estimating what is beautiful, and this is only a 'rule 












It cannot be set down in a formula and serving as a precept - for then the judgement upon the 
beautiful would be determinable according to concepts. Rather must the rule be gathered from 
the performance ... [T]his is something which cannot be done by mere descriptions (especially 
not in the line of the arts of speech) (eI, §47: 171). 
'Taste' is the means of judging these fine art objects, and thus of the artist's learning 
by example. In introducing taste into genius, however, Kant gets himself caught up in 
the tautology of taste and common sense once more. 'Taste' is what ensures the 
universal communicability of the works of genius, yet this 'communicability' 
involves no communication, least of all anything resembling speech. Here 'universal 
communicability', the rule of thumb of the faculty of judgement, or of common sense, 
is the rule that comes after the fact. It is the rule, as in form, given by the genius to 
fine art, the rule of what is beautiful, or what is to judged beautiful. It cannot precede 
the judgement, which is at the same time its own judgement. Weare far from an 
Arendtian conception of common sense as the condition for judgements of taste, for 
her analogous to sociability as the basis of all judgement, as the origin and end of the 
process of human history. What we have here is a more circular or perhaps a better 
word would be dialectical relationship of what constitutes the constellation of 
jUdgement, genius, and taste or common sense. 
The Citizen Subject, Genius and the revolution 
Guyer argues that Kant's discussion of genius excludes the possibility of 'fine art' 
being symbolic of the moral, since it is not grounded in autonomy, since 'art gratifies 
our inclination to sociability, which is itself of no direct moral value' (Guyer, 1993: 
271). This is in direct contrast to A.rendt's argument for whom the primacy of taste in 
Kant's discussion of genius implies the importance of judgement over action, that is 
the role of the spectator as judge, and thus makes sociabili ty (in the form of a 
common sense) the basis of both aesthetic and (radical) political judgement, such as 
Kant's moral justiiication of (the French) revolution from the perspective of his 
philosophy of history. Rather we have traced the inner contradiction of 'taste' within 
Kant's transcendental deduction. That the 'sublime' is excluded from this deduction is 
due to its exclusion of the problem of 'taste' altogether since it is removed from 











within the subject, now herself 'sublime', who experiences both helplessness 
(unfreedom) before the very nature, of which she is also fearless because her reason is 
autonomous (free). This reminds us of another contradictory double we have 
encountered: the 'citizen-subject' of Kant's moral politics. 
Arendt makes a link between the political-moral and the aesthetic premised on a 
successful transcendental deduction. By definition such deductions can never really 
be successful, they can only prove the possibility of success, and are premised on a 
contradictionxix : 'the antinomy oftaste': the thesis that judgements of taste are 
subjective and the antithesis that judgements of taste are objective. For Kant [TJhere 
is no possibility of removing the conflict of the above principles ... this double sense, 
or point of view ... is necessary for our power of transcendental judgement' (el, §56-
7: 206tx• We have sketched this contradiction or antinomy of 'taste' in the form of 
the question of whether common sense is presupposed or whether it comes about in 
the act of judging. 
It is necessary to return to Kant's 'judgement' of the French Revolution according to 
his philosophy of history, which for Arendt is an 'aesthetic' judgement. We will show 
that this particularly modern philosophy of history as progress or process is itself 
based on 'revolution' as metahistorical concept. Kant's judgement of the revolution 
will now be mapped, not to 'pure aesthetic judgements' of objects of natural beauty, 
which are symbolic of the moral. Instead, following from the unresolved tensions we 
have traced in Kant's aesthetics we will show how this judgement is rather manifested 
in the two categories of the aesthetic that do not exactly fit in with natural beauty or 
morality: genius and the sublime. 
4. Revolution as Metahistorical Concept 
In conclusion, we connect Kant's discussion of the revolution in CF with an idea of 
history that is peculiar to that period of history we now call Modernity. We will 
borrow the argument of historian Reinhart Koselleck that this modem idea of history, 
of the past and its relationship to the past, takes as its point of departure from older 
forms of history, the French revolution, or more specifically it originates in the 











use Koselleck's conceptual history of the 'revolution' for historical thought in his 
book 'Futures Past - On the Semantics of Historical Time'. 
Koselleck argues that 'revolution' becomes both a supra- and meta-historical concept 
in Modernity. Previously, history is determined by the religious belief in the final 
judgement: 
[U]ntil well into the 16th century, the history of Christianity is a history of expectations ... the 
constant anticipation of the End of the world on the one hand and the continual deferment of 
that End on the other. (Koselleck, 1985: 6) 
What this implies is an a-temporal idea of history, where the past, present and future 
are able to exist in 'a common historical plane' (Koselleck, 1985: 4) integrated by the 
idea of the approaching end. What happens in the reformation, however, is an 
acceleration of the time approaching the End, and he attributes this to a change in the 
role of the church after the end of the 30 years of religious civil war. For Koselleck, 
the role of the church is no longer to sublimate the end of time in its own history of 
salvation, but this now becomes the role ofthe state. As such religious civil war 
becomes war betvveen states, thus the emergence of 'politics', and the separation of 
the moral/religious sphere (Koselleck, 1985: 8). This sees the end of predictions of the 
end. What replaces this is the 'delicate art of political calculation' (Koselleck, 1985: 
14), or rational prognosis. However, it is the philosophy of history as progress, or 
progress as historical process that decisively 'detached early modernity from its past 
and the same time inaugurated modernity with a new future.' (Koselleck, 1985: 16) 
The bearer of the Modem philosophy of historical process was the citizen emancipated form 
absolutist subjection and the tutelage of the Church: the prophet philosophe, as he was once 
strikingly characterised in the 18 th century. (Koselleck, 1985: 17) 
It is the French Revolution itself that breaks with the past because of the way that it 
opens up the future as an unknown. Koselleck says of Diderot' s prediction of the 
revolution in the Encyclopaedia that' its point of departure is modem' (Koselleck, 
1985: 18). For Diderot says, 'What will succeed this revolution? No one knows' 











In his essay 'Historia Magistra Vitae', Koselleck discusses the change from history as 
'the greater teacher oflife' (Koselleck, 1985: 22), whose events and stories have 
exemplary validity for the present, for teaching the rulers of the present how to act 
according to the past, to history as 'geschichte'. Geschichte does not consist of 
chronicles, of accounts of past lives that serve as examples for present ones. 
Koselleck calls Geschichte a 'collective singular', consisting of singular histories 
transformed into a world history: 
[T]he \VTiter of history who is worth such a name must represent each incident as part of a 
whole or, what amounts to the same thing, within each incident illuminate the form of history 
in general. (Koselleck, 1985: 30-31) 
Geschichte takes on the form or the poetics of the epic, or the novel, and 'converged 
as event and representation' (Koselleck, 1985: 27), demanding that events and 
individual accounts are integrated into a unified whole: the collective singular called 
Geschichte, that claims to be the true (his)story. 
History as teacher for life is now replaced by a history that can only determine 'the 
general resultant', an era, or a process. As such Geschichte already contains its own 
philosophy of history within itself: 'History and the philosophy of history are 
complementary concepts which render impossible any attempt at a philosophisation of 
history' (Koselleck, 1985: 32). The meaning of the event in other words is not in its 
'explanatory value' for the present, but is immanent, contained within its own end. 
What is meant by this is best explained in Koselleck's comparison of the central place 
of the revolution in French thought to that of Geschichte in German thought. This was 
due to the way that 'the French Revolution ... seemed to outstrip all previous 
experience' (Koselleck, 1985: 33). Its uniqueness meant the impossibility of its 
'similitude' to the past examples or its repetition in the unknown future: it is a 
discontinuity with the past, which is thus temporalised instead of a continuity of 
past/present/future. The revolution becomes a 'metahistorical concept' (Koselleck, 
1985: 46), which for philosopher Niebuhr: has lent "epic unity to the whole" 
(Koselleck, 1985:.30), serving the purpose of Geschichte, of giving the meaning to 











Now, this 'metahistorical' concept, revolution, is somewhat contradictory. Koselleck 
traces its uses from the French to the first industrial and then the second industrial 
revolution, and to the American civil war as well as to the postcolonial, showing how 
it is the 'catchword' of modern political vocabulary, used to denote almost any major 
change. He traces its origins to the natural cycle of the planets, as such 
'transhistorical', to its post-French revolutionary historical sense. This Historical use 
of the concept, since the revolution, that is after 1789, is determined by the French 
revolution. It becomes 'a collective singular', uniting within itself 'the course of all 
individual revolutions'. It is a political transformation that implies a social 
transformation: the question was' to make out of the French revolution a social 
revolution, that is an overturning of all currently existing states' (Koselleck, 1985: 48-
9). It is characterised by the 'acceleration of time ... an unconscious secularisation of 
eschatological expectation' (Koselleck, 1985: 47). This acceleration of the present to 
become the future is once again 'fixatation on an end-state by participating 
actors ... the subterfuge of a historical process, robbing them of their judgement' 
(Koselleck, 1985: 18). Thus revolution already contains reaction to revolution within 
itself: the end of the revolution; thus acceleration implies retardation. This philosophy 
of historical process as progress is characterised both by an open future, but because 
of this the historical subj ect, or citizen, 'cannot wait for this future. He wants this 
future to come more quickly and he himself wants to accelerate it' (Koselleck, 1985: 
18). 
It also implies a total social revolution, along with the individual political ones, 'a 
world revolution', but at the same time the acceleration of the end implies its 
incompleteness and revolution implicitly contains its contrary: 'counterrevolution' or 
reaction. (Koselleck, 1985: 52) Thus, it is necessarily declared a 'permanent 
revolution': 'history of the future will be the history ofrevolution' (Koselleck, 1985: 
49). Yet, the 'revolution' demands that the future be unknown. Thus, while historical 
time is differentiated by, or after, the revolution according to the cycle of acceleration 
and retardation, the cycle of revolutiOn/reaction, how can it presuppose an unknown 
future, which is the condition for the philosophy of history as progress? To answer 











In fact Arendt concludes her Thirteenth Session with an inkling of the self-
contradiction within the philosophy of history as progress being the rule for any 
(radical) judgement of the present, and the peculiarly aesthetic nature of such a 
judgement: 
We were talking about the partiality of the actor, who because he is involved, never sees the 
meaning of the whole. This is true for all stories ... .The same is not true for the beautiful or for 
any deed in itself, The beautiful is, in Kantian terms, an end in itself because all its possible 
meaning is contained within itself, without reference to others without linkage, as it were, to 
other beautiful things .. ,. [I]n other words, the very idea of progress if it is more than a 
change in circumstances and an improvement of the world contradicts Kant's notion of 
man's dignity, Progress, moreover, means that the story never has an end, The end of the story 
itself is in infinity, There is no point at which we might stand still and look back with the 
backward glance of the historian, (Arendt, 1982: 77) 
This somewhat misplaced reference to the philosophy of history in Arendt's final 
session, after her argument is concluded, seems to complicate her conclusion that it is 
sociability and not progress that are the basis of moral-political judgements of the 
present. It is this final contradiction that my work has ultimately led from and 
returned to, like the revolution that circles back on itself. As in Arendt's unravelling 
of her own conclusion, this makes for another critique that is also struggling to 
conclude itself. 
Is the human race still improving? 
Arendt quotes Kant, 
Now I claim to predict to the human race-even without prophetic insight - according to the 
aspects and omens of our day, the attainment of this goal. That is, I predict its progress toward 
the better, which from now on, turns out to be no longer completely reversible. For such a 
phenomenon in human history is not TO beforgottell, "But even if the end viewed in 
connection with this event should no\ now be anained, even if the revolution or reform of a 
national constitution should finally miscarry, or after some time had elapsed, everything 
should relapse into its former rut (as politiCians now predict), that philosophical prophecy still 
would lose nothing of its force. For that event is too important, too much interwoven with the 
interest of humanity, and its influence too widely propagated in all areas of the world to not be 











of new efforts of this kind ... [T]o him who does not consider what happens in just one people 
but also has regard to the whole scope of all the peoples on earth who will gradually come to 
participate in these events, this reveals the prospect of an immeasurable time. '(Arendt, 1982, 
quote from CF: 46, italics mine) 
All of the characteristics ofKoselleck's 'revolution' as metahistorical concept are 
present here: the 'immeasurable time' of the future, the prediction of the 'relapse' of 
the revolution into counter-revolution and the 'philosophical prophecy' of the 
progress of mankind, which has no end point but that will be characterised by the 
repetition ofrevolution. The antinomy of the metahistorical concept of revolution as 
'open future' and as 'repetition ofrevolutionlreaction' becomes clear when we retrace 
the link to the aesthetic. 
It is the main argument of this dissertation that the French revolution is the point of 
departure of a strangely aesthetic relationship between the historical subject and 
history. Ifwe take the revulution to be an art object, instead ofa beauty of nature, 
since it is manmade, we could say that the revolution is the beautiful object, as it 
contains its end within itself: counterrevolution. The genius, the 'nation of gifted 
people' (Kant, CF: 182), has substituted this aesthetic idea of revolution for the 
abstract idea of progress. Progress, however, is the metahistorical concept by which 
we judge the revolution as an historical event, i.e. as beautiful. This would explain the 
contradictory nature of 'revolution' as metahistorical concept. For the actor there is no 
future outside of revolution/repetition, but for the historical subject, the spectator, the 
future is open for progress, itself an idea exemplified by the revolution. 
However, to quote Foucault on Kant, 
[W]hat matters in the revolution is not the Revolution itself, it is what takes place in the heads 
of the people who do not make it or in any case are not its principle actors. (Foucault, 
1984:94) 
The rule is not deduced from the object itself, as if it were the aesthetic form given to 
the content of a rational idea, like progress. In fact philosophy and history struggle to 











outstrip all previous experience' (Koselleck, 1985: 33). The progress of the human 
race is deduced from the disinterested sympathy of the public of world spectators, 
who judge their own judgement as 'universally communicable'. It is this judgement 
which seems to assume a beautiful form, becoming symbolic of the moral disposition 
in the human race (for Kant beauty is symbolic of morality). It is the consensus, the 
singular collective reaction to the revolution that becomes the beautiful object, itself 
the form or the aesthetic idea the genius, the philosophy of history, substitutes for 
progress, which gives the rule according to which to judge only in the act of judging. 
But what of the contradictions contained within 'common sense', taste, and genius? 
Are these really the correct terms with which to make the link from political 
judgements to the aesthetic? Since judgement judges itself, it presupposes the 
'common sense' that it in fact brings about via deducing a rule by which to judge. Our 
argument has refused to resolve this contradiction by dividing judgement into a two-
stage process thereby making 'common sense' apriori, thus opening Kant's text up to 
make the' empirical' existence of society the condition for judgement. Instead of 
making 'common sense' apriori, that is the sense of being in society, of having a 
common rule or moral obligation to society, we would rather say that this 'common 
sense' comes about only in the act of judging, as a requirement for it, a kind if trick or 
sleight of hand. A brief discussion of Althusser's reading of Rousseau will be helpful 
on this point. 
Althusser locates a discrepancy within the 'exchange' that characterises Rousseau's 
'Social Contract': 
the paradox of the Social Contract is to bring together two RP's [Recipient Parties), one of 
which exists both prior to and externally to the contract, while the other does not, since it is 
the product of the contract itself, or better: its object, its end. (Althusser. 1972: 129) 
Furthermore this 
discrepancy can be recognised between ... the juridical concept if the contract, which 
Rousseau imports into his problematic to give it cover, and the actual content of his 
contract ... [\)n fact, his social contract is not a contract but an act of constitution of the second 












In other words, we have again arrived at the impasse between the positions of 
Foucault (and implicitly A-H) and Habennas and Arendt. One could argue that 
Habennas and Arendt base the aesthetics of their critique of power, or their respective 
political philosophies on an apriori assumption of 'common sense' or 
communicability, that presupposes society, a shared or common understanding at the 
basis of all political, moral and historical judgements. It is thus that they present the 
'social' as a legitimate contract, bracketing out the discrepancy noted by Althusser. 
Foucault and indirectly A-H have very different conceptions of power irreconcilable 
with its presentation as legitimate contract. Our problematisation of Kant's 
transcendental deduction and thus the link of aesthetic to political-moral judgements 
echoes Althusser's reservations about Rousseau's' Social Contract'. We too have 
picked up a 'discrepancy' in judgements of taste, and in moral-political judgements: 
how can ajudgement be made according to a rule of which not the object/event itself, 
but the judgement of the object/event is exemplary. How can 'common sense' exist 
prior to the judgement which necessarily presupposes it as apriori? 
Several interesting points of convergence present themselves here. Is the juridical-
political contract a type of aesthetic imaginary? Does the so-called 'contract' actually 
bring into existence the very society that contracts, in a way analogous to the way that 
a judgement of taste brings into existence the 'taste' or 'common sense' required to 
make such judgements. themselves of 'empirical interest' to 'society'? Is this then the 
'aesthetic' fonn of the Arendtian and Habennassian critiques of (civil) society? What 
is the relationship bern'een this aesthetic and morality; is it a natural beauty, a natural 
obligation to society and thus symbolic of the 'moral', or does it merely present itself 
as natural, even though there is some genius behind it? 
It is not my intention to follow up on these questions here; I am interested in those 
critiques that fail to resolve the 'discrepancies' in taste or political-moral judgements: 
Foucault, Adorno and Horkheimer, and if only indirectly, on a subtextuallevel, Kant 
himself. Each in tum articulates their radical critiques in tenns of the contradictions 
we have been so careful to keep alive throughout this dissertation. It is now to finally 











The Sublime Citizell Subject of History 
Ifwe return to Kant's internalisation of the political principle, the double life of 
'citizen subject', that comes after the revolution, or grows up with it, then the 
relationship of the 'citizen subject' to its present, is we propose, an aesthetic 
relationship. This is an aesthetic relationship to revolution-enlightenment-critique or 
power-knowledge-history that leaves the citizen subject in the somewhat strange 
position of being a spectator, and an actor who cannot act. As we have discussed the 
double life of the 'citizen subject', as both public and private, spectator and actor, is 
sublime. The condition then for the experience of the sublime is an experience that 
occurs in a state of schizophrenia, both an immediate and real 'fear' as well as the 
fearlessness of 'regarding our estate as exalted above' that fear (el, §28: 114). It is 
this that Guyer describes as the 'pain of being moral'. When Foucault connects Kant's 
historicisation of his own knowledge, enlightenment, to his discussion of revolution, 
and furthermore connects this to his own mode of genealogical critique, he inherits 
the Kantian antinomies ofthe historical relationship between reason-power-
knowledge and the judging subject. Ifbeing the double 'citizen subject' is the 
condition for historical reflection on Enlightenment; and being spectator, unable to 
act, is the condition for judgement of the revolution then such judgements happen in 
state of sublimi ty within the judge, who is necessari Iy split into citizen and subj eet, 
spectator and actor, who cannot act on his judgement, for he cannot rebel. 
The judgement is not of the revolution as beautiful object, but of the spectators, who 
enter into a sublime relationship with themselves in relation to the revolution. This 
judgement of the revolution is made in an excess of spectatorship, an 'excess of 
history' (Nietzsche, 19984: 115) as Nietzsche would say, at the expense of a real actor 
or a real genius. It is the attempt to escape from the cycle of revolution, via the history 
of philosophy as progress. At the same time this history, itself its own philosophy of 
history, is based on a metahistorical concept itself derived from that revolution. It is 
itself revolutionary: a cyclical operation of being yourself and not quite yourself, of 
making rules where there are only examples, from which you cannot learn. 
Finally, as this judgement is 'sublime' it is necessarily symbolic of the 'moral', that is 











such judgements be? While Kant excludes the category of the sublime in art from his 
el, what if we were to connect this judgement of the sublime to artistic genius, the 
one who gives the rule by which to judge and who is somewhat excluded from the 
autonomy necessary for morality? The genius would be the one who presents the 
aesthetic idea of revolution as a substitute for 'progress' and who does so via 
providing 'progress' as the very rule by which to judge, not the revolution itself, but 
the spectators who watch with 'disinterested delight'. Is this the genius 'the 
philosophy of history as progress' herself? If so then the rule according to which you 
judge is the genius, a geni us who produces its own object, which is itself a judgement 
(thUS a double object~ revolutionary action and world spectators). It is a genius with 
an excess of taste. 
Genealogy/Dialecticl Aesthetic 
It is my argument that A~H's dialectical philosophy of history as 
enlightenment/Enlightenment is caught up in the metahistorical concept of 
revolution/reaction. This Dialectical history, the progression of domination/regression 
of civilisation, is revolutionary in that like the revolution it too contains its reaction 
within itself, the end is always nigh, progress is already regression, enlightenment 
becomes myth. This is the history in which the actors of revolution are caught up: 
they accelerate the coming of the revolution but at the same time they accelerate it 
towards its end. Adorno and Horkheimer's attempt to reflect on their present in the 
form of a radical critique is an attempt to distance themselves from it, that is an 
attempt too 'break' with it by positing 'Enlightenment' as a break with all previous 
forn1s of enlightenment, in much the same way as the philosophy of history as 
progress posits The French revolution as break with the past, and with its Historie. 
The former 'break' is the condition for the dialectical philosophy of history, but it is 
also its undoing as demonstrated in section 1. The 'break' of the French revolution 
with all previous forms of history has been shown to be the condition for Kant's 
'radical' reflection on his own present, which I have shown to have an aesthetic form, 
and to be based on the sublime existence of the 'citizen subject'. As such A-H get 
caught up in the very problematics of that aesthetic; that is in its excess of 











(metahistorical) concept of revolution as the aesthetic idea of progress, removing the 
ability to judge from the actors, and the ability to act from the spectators. 
Thus both Foucault and A-H are caught up in this same aesthetic predicament of 
judgement. In order to detach oneself from the present, that is to escape its cycle of 
revolution/reaction, it is necessary to assume the position of spectator, who cannot 
act, that is to become the double 'citizen subject' of a history, who is the artist that 
creates your judgement herself. 
, The book is presented take up the proposed debate between Foucault and Habermas on the topic of 
Modernity, a conference apparently proposed by Foucault on Kant's WE. As such it 'implicitly 
addresses the impasse' of their positions on the questions of 'critique, power, and modernity'. (Kelly, 
1994: 3-4) 
ii Habermas traces its emergence from the bourgeois, liberal private sphere, economically separate from 
the state and originally taking the form of a critical literary public that plays a political, that is critical 
role in the dualism state/civil society. It is the 'recovery of the ideal from flawed material practise' 
(Calhoun, 39) that Habermas wants in tracing the decline of the public sphere into a commodified 
public opinion. 
iii For Arendt 'speech' is the basis of political, public life, versus labour and work, which are essentially 
activities of the private sphere. (Arendt: HC)The 'politicisation', making 'public' of labour and work in 
the 'soClal question' results in actual depoliticisation due to the inability to separate actual political, 
public issues from the material needs of 'mass society', who are in fact subordinated to a 
homogenising public opinion.(Cohen & Arato: 188-9). 
" 'Rorty welcomes Foucault as a convert to this way of thinking' (Korris, 1993: 69) as evidenced by 
Foucault's private-aesthetlcist ethos, erasing the boundary between philosophy and poetry. 
'Walzer's 'liberal communitarian' position also takes aim at Foucault's 'stress on the autonomy of 
ethical judgement', but is critical of it's a-political implications for 'our active, participant role' 
(Norris. ! 993: 53). 
vi Both these critiques converge on Foucault's discussion of Baudelaire as exemplary modem subject, 
'which promotes a view of ethics as entirely bound up with the project of aesthetic self-fashioning' 
(:Korris, 1993: 68) 
'I' It is here that Foucault leaves Kant's text and demonstrates the attitude of Modernity as exemplified 
by Baudelaire's 'heroization' of the present. It is this slide from philosophy to poetry which becomes 
the common ground for readings by Walzer and Rorty. 
'"' Althusser also uses the word 'alienation' in this sense to describe what occurs in Rousseau's 'Social 
Contract'. as 'an act of exchange' between the individual and the community (Althusser, 1972: 129). 
"This provides for a more complex link to the aesthetic than a mere aesthetic self-fashioning or 
aestheticisation of politics. 
\ Sheehan discusses the how the' French revolution reverberated through German intellectual life' 











xi Hannah Arendt delivered these lectures at the New School for Social Research, in 1970. They would 
have formed part of her last volume of the Life of the Mind, "Judging". The lectures have been edited 
from seminar notes by Ronald Beiner. (Beiner, 1982: vii-viii) 
xii 'One must not be in the least prepossessed in favour of the real existence of the thing, but must 
preserve complete indifference in this respect, in order to play the part of judge in matters of taste. ' 
( 43) 
xiii Kant later swops the terms: sensus communis initially refers to 'common understanding' as opposed 
to 'common sense' necessary for judgements of taste (eJ, §20: 82) , and later sensus communis is 
referred to as the 'public sense' necessary for aesthetic judgement (eJ, §40: 151). 
xiv Paul Guyer (,Pleasure and Society in Kant"s Theory of Taste') also proposes a 'duplex process of 
reflection' (Guyer, 1982: 21): direct reflection on the object leading to pleasure and reflection on this 
initial experience, which he notes as contradictory, since Kant presupposes 'communicability' as 
necessary for both stages. 
xv For Arendt 'speech is what makes man a political animal', in her hierarchical three-fold division of 
the 'vita-activa' it falls under 'action', i.e. the history-making activity between men, versus labour and 
work, which are essentially actvities of the private sphere. (Arendt, 1958: chapter 1) 
xvi Guyer resolves this by introducing two types of pleasure, associated with each respective stage. His 
solution again presupposes the existence of empirical society as necessary for the second stage of 
reflection: 'there is no taste in solitude'(Guyer, 1982: 52). This, however, reintroduces an 'empirical' 
condition into the apriori, as we have argued: '[T]he empirical interest in the beautiful exists only in 
society' (CJ, §41: 155, italics mine). 
xvii Eva Schaper asks, 'how Kant can maintain the inclusion of the judgement on the sublime in the 
class of aesthetic judgements next to ... the j. of the beautiful' (Schaper,: 383). For her the sublime 
introduces Kant's discussion of genius and art. 
"iii This is taken up by Paul Guyer (,Nature, Art, Autonomy'). 
XIX Synthetic apriori propositicns can be shown to exits in 'the domain proper to dialectical illusion' 
(Forster, 1989: 6). For example the proof of the subjective conditions of the possibility ofknow\edge 
in Crilique of Pure Reason depend on showing the possibility of an independent objective order, 
knowledge of which is not possible. 
"Transcendental deductions generally require the introduction of a third term between subject and 
predicate; in the Critique of Pure Reason, this is the transcendental subject. It could be argued that 
Kant by making Beauty a symbol of morality and thus introducing 'Freedom' as the mediating term 













If Enlightenment is critique, and both are revolution, then all our judgements on our 
own present, whether political or historical, are caught up so to speak in the aesthetics 
of revolution, which have become the aesthetics of the modern philosophy of history 
as progress, itself inseparable from the metahistorical concept of revolution, which 
means both an open future and the endless repetition of revolution. As such the 
relationship of the 'citizen subject' to revolution, which is also enlightenment and 
thus critique, is aesthetic: it is a judgement made subjectively that presents itself as 
objective and the rule by which it judges (taste) is only ever a product of that very act 
of judging, of which it takes the judgement, not the object as exemplary. However, the 
'citizen subject' can only judge its own judgement of the present, in the form of the 
revolution or the enlightenment or critique, while refusing to act. Actor and spectator 
are one person. The genius is always the same: the philosophy of history as progress. 
This act of jUdging, in other words, can only ever be 'sublime'. 
It is perhaps for this reason that Adorno and Horkheimer connect Nietzsche, Sade and 
Kant. Sade writes a novel that defies all the requirements of the beautiful object, but 
invokes its opposite: disgust. As such it is a kind of non-novel, with no storyline but 
the repetition of the logic Juliette's orgies, murders and long philosophical discussions 
of the latter. In 'The Uses and Abuses of History for Life', Nietzsche, says that '[t]he 
oversaturation of an age with history ... creates a contrast between inner and outer' 
(Nietzsche, 1983: 83), and that this is because, he 
who allows his artists in history to go on preparing a world exhibition for him; 
he has become a strolling spectator and has arrived at a condition in which 
even great wars and revolutions are able to influence him for hardly more then 
a moment. (Nietszche, 1983: 83) 
Nietzsche's attempt to detach himself from this excess of history and to redirect it 
from the idea of history as progress is influential on Foucault's genealogical method l , 











Kant, Sade, Nietzsche, as well as Foucault and the Frankfurt School attempt to 
articulate their critiques, their thought in relation to the very historical moment that 
determines that thought. While they do this for different reasons and at different 
times, they all attempt a 'radical' critique of the present, in the sense of aiming at the 
roots, or the heart of the present, and at its established authorities. In doing so, I would 
argue, they get caught up in the very aesthetic form of the problem of 
critique/enlightenment/revolution that I have traced in the Kant. I have followed 
Arendt's reading of Kant to show that there is a different way of working out the 
formal relationship between the aesthetic and the political, or the present, which does 
not resolve the contradictions within these aesthetic judgements. I have shown that 
these contradictions carry over into the aesthetic form of political and historical 
judgements in the categories of genius and the sublime. 
Here I refer to the emergence of the sublime 'citizen subject' of history from the 
French revolution, her double existence has been shown to resemble the 
'schizophrenia' ofthe Kantian sublime, and thus to be the condition of judgements of 
the present that are 'radical', as exemplified by Kant's approval of the revolution. It 
could be argued that Kant attempts to make a radical critique of his present: he 
attempts to justify revolution, yet without taking an actual political position. He does 
this via jumping out of the present entirely to look at it from the perspective of the 
philosophy of history which takes his relationship to that present, whether it be in the 
form of revolution, enlightenment or his own critique, to be exemplary of the rule of 
that history, that is the rule by which to judge not so much the historical event or its 
moment but his own relationship to it as world spectator. This is the dilemma of 
radical critique when faced with its relationship to political practise, and it is perhaps 
a further connection between all these thinkers that while their thought is imminently 
political, it fails to articulate a directly political position. Our aim was not to read a 
politics into anyone of these thinkers but to show how each one comes up against the 
same formulation of the problem, the same cul-de-sac, which is essentially a problem 
of the philosophy of history based on the metahistorical concept of revolution. As 
such the form of the problem is aesthetic. 
What are the implications of the aesthetic formulation of the impasse of radical 











relationship to power, and its changing historical configurations? Is the way out of 
this impasse via a new philosophy of history, one that manages to disentangle itself 
from the aesthetics of the revolution and the artist we call progress? What are the 
implications of a fonnallink between the political-historical and the aesthetic? Are 
there two aesthetics, one for the juridico-political model of power and one for the 
disciplinary model? It is not possible for this dissertation to take up the questions 
raised by this theoretical account, it remains an interpretative exercise that for lack of 
space has not been applied in practice, say to a literary text. Instead we must leave 
these questions open, for now. 
Thus, I conclude the argument of this dissertation, which has no pretension of calling 
itself a critique. Any radical critique of the present that attempts to escape it via the 
Modern philosophy of history will necessarily become caught up in the sublimity of 
being a Modern 'citizen subject' of history. As such this means being caught up in the 
particularly modern fonn of an aesthetic2 that is for lack of a better word, 
revolutionary. 
I In ']\iietzsche, Geneaology, History', Foucault discusses the several notions of history present in 
Nietzsche, to show how he complicated the idea of historical origin. 
~ Aesthetic is used here in the Kantian sense of a non-logical cognition, something without a 
determinate concept, and 'whose detennining ground cannot be other than subjective' (el, § 1: 24, 
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